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BEYOND DEFUNIS: DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT
ANALYSIS AND MANDATED "PREFERENCES" IN
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS
MICHAEL J. ZIMMERt

DeFunis v. Odegaard1 involved an unsuccessful challenge by a
white law school applicant to a program for the "preferential"' 2 admist Associate Professor, Wayne State Law School. This article would never have
been finished without the sharp-to-blunt pencil of my friend and former colleague,
Donald J. Weidner. My notions of discrimination analysis could not have developed
without Charles A. Sullivan. I must also thank Kent Greenawalt, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Al Rosenthal for their helpful comments and careful reading of this paper.
1. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
Already considerable scholarship has emerged. See Ely, The Constitutionality of
Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cii. L. REv. 723 (1974); Morris, Equal Protection, Affirmative Action and Racial Preferences in Law Admissions, 49 WASH. L REv. 1
(1973); Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection Clause:
An Analysis of the Competing Arguments, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 343 (1974); DeFunis
Symposium, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 483 (1975); Symposium, DeFunis: The Road Not
Taken, 60 VA. L REv. 917 (1974). See also the three volume edition of the record in
the case, Record, DeFunis v. Odegaard (A. Ginger ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Record].
2. The best description of what preferential admissions is all about comes from
O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher
Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 700 n.3 (1971):
The central term which will be used throughout-"preferential admissions policies"--may mean many things. At one extreme, a preference may mean no
more than tipping the balance in favor of one student rather than another when
all other factors are roughly equal. Some choice must be made, and it is technically accurate to classify as a preference the criterion by which the tie is
broken. This is, of course, the mildest form of preference. At the opposite
extreme is the fixed quota-a guarantee that a certain percentage of the freshman class will consist of residents of the state, children of alumni, veterans,
Catholics, pre-meds, or others. Such a preference may admit members of the
preferred group whose objective abilities fall far below those of non-quota applicants thereby excluded. Conversely, of course, if the quota imposes a ceiling as well as a floor, it may serve to exclude members of the quota group
who are actually superior to applicants outside the quota simply because the
percentage has already been filled.
There is a wide range of options between the fixed quota and the factor
that merely tips the balance when others are equal. Preference may sometimes
be given by adding points to a standardized test score in a manner of a handicap when the raw score unfairly reflects the examinee's ability or potential.
Or a test score may be disregarded altogether in appraising the performance
of an individual or members of a group. Sometimes applicants will be admitted on the basis of a certain qualification that others do not share-graduate work in a particular field, military service, or business experience. In other
cases an applicant who would otherwise be rejected may be preferred by conditional admission-that is, by acceptance contingent on satisfactory completion
of a special preparatory program or course. Finally, the school may unconditionally admit students who are below usual standards in particular respects
and expect to supplement the regular curriculum with offerings designed to
remedy the deficiency. Through these and perhaps other methods may the
benefits of an explicitly preferential policy be conferred upon persons who do
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sion of members of certain minority groups. The thesis of this article is
that such programs are not only constitutionally permissible when operated to promote racial integration, but that they may well be constitutionally mandated when minority groups can show that law schools
have failed properly to promote racial integration in the operation of
their admissions practices.'
Discrimination, or disproportionate impact, analysis as a litigation
technique for challenges that institutions have failed to promote
integration has exhibited three strands of development, each pointing to
a similar, if not identical, structure of litigation. One rapidly developing area is characterized by the application of discrimination analysis to
employment discrimination by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'
Plaintiffs make out a prima facie case by showing that defendant's employment policies have a "disparate effect" or "differential impact" on
members of groups protected by the Act. That prima facie case may be
rebutted if the defendant can carry the burden of showing business justification. Only when defendant fails to carry its burden are the challenged employment practices found to be illegal discrimination. This
two-step, burden-shifting definition of discrimination is the model that
can be applied to the law school admission process.
A second strand of discrimination analysis development builds a
bridge between Title VII and equal protection analysis. Before Title
VII was extended to cover public employees, 5 plaintiffs challenging
public employment practices argued successfully that the concepts of
not meet the standard criteria for admission but who possess other qualities
which the admitting institution seeks.
3. The typical system of admission to law school these days relies on a numerical
formula, the Predicted First Year Average (PFYA). While each school has its own
system, the formula combines the applicant's undergraduate average, Law School Admission Test (LSAT) score, LSAT writing ability score and, most recently, a factor that
takes into account qualitative differences among undergraduate schools. The relationship between the various factors is determined for each law school by the Educational
Testing Service, based on prior experience at that school. Naturally, the higher the
PFYA the better; some schools automatically accept all applicants above some point and
reject those below some cutoff point. Most PFYA's, however, fall within a range of
discretion between the two cutoffs. Typically, considerations beyond the PFYA enter in
the discretion exercised in most admissions decisions. Most law schools also employ
some sort of program that modifies this process for members of protected minority
groups. See generally AssocIATioN OF AMERiCAN LAw SCHOOLS & THE LAW SCHOOL
ADmSSION COUNCIL, PRELAW HANDBOOK (1973).

4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970).
5. Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e(a) (1974)).
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discrimination as developed in private employment situations under
Title VII ought to be applicable to public employment under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The result has been the
incorporation of disproportionate impact analysis as at least one wing of
general equal protection analysis.
The third strand of development traces general equal protection
analysis as applied to cases involving racial discrimination. Particular
emphasis is placed on the recent school cases, out of which emerges a
positive duty on the part of state authorities to promote racial integration, as well as a model for litigating whether the authorities have satisfied that duty. Plaintiffs challenging the way school authorities carry out
their duty to integrate can make out a prima facie case by showing that
most students attend largely segregated schools. Once a prima facie
case has been established, defendants carry the rebuttal burden of
establishing that such segregation occurred despite the best efforts of the
school authorities to promote integration.
I.

PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS ARE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE

A.

DeFunis v. Odegaard

Plaintiff Marco DeFunis, Jr. applied unsuccessfully to the University of Washington Law School in 1970, and again in 1971. When he
was denied admission the second time, he brought a lawsuit claiming
that many admittees to the law school had credentials "much below the
credentials and qualifications of the plaintiff."6 The issue of racial
discrimination was not raised in the complaint; it entered the case
only when the defendant university introduced testimony that some of
the admittees whose paper credentials were less impressive than plaintiff's were minority group members admitted under the program for
preferential admission. In fact, plaintiffs counsel resisted raising the
racial discrimination issue. 7 Nevertheless, the trial judge overruled
objections to the testimony of university officials describing minority
admission procedures.
6. Single Appendix in the Supreme Court of the United States at 14, DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), reprintedin 1 Record, supranote 1, at 14.
7. Trial Transcript, DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 741727 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1971)
230-31, partially reprinted in 1 Record, supra note 1, at 78. The failure of a true
adversarial focus on the issue of racial discrimination was one basis for an argument that
certiorari had been improvidently granted. See Pollak, DeFunis Non Est Disputandum,
75 COLUM. L. Rnv. 495, 505-06 (1975).
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The basic admission procedures of the law school relied heavily,
but not exclusively, on the applicant's junior-senior college grade point
average and Law School Admission Test (LSAT) score, which were
computed into a Predicted First Year Average (PFYA).s Applicants
with PFYA's below a cutoff point were summarily rejected. Those
applicants who indicated that their dominant ethnic origin was a minority included within the scope of the preferential admissions program10
were treated separately, and somewhat differently. The automatic cutoff was not used, minority applicants were compared only to other
minority applicants, and less weight was given the PFYA. 11 Thirty-six
of the thirty-seven minority group admittees had PFYA's lower than
DeFunis.
The trial court, relying on Brown v. Board of Education,"2 held
that the statement of the first Justice Harlan in dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson, that "[o]ur Constitution is color blind,"13 is now the applicable equal protection standard. Because the law school treated minority applicants differently from majority applicants, the trial judge found
the system to be one using racial classifications which, in his view, were
per se unconstitutional. 4
On appeal the Washington Supreme Court reversed. The basic
issue was "whether the law school may, in consonance with the equal
protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions, consider the
racial or ethnic background of applicants as one factor in the selection
of students."' 5 Within that broad issue the court recognized three
subordinate questions:
(A) whether race can ever be considered as one factor in the admissions policy of a state law school or whether racial classifications
are per se unconstitutional because the equal protection of the laws
requires that law school admissions be "color-blind"; (B) if consideration of race is not per se unconstitutional, what is the appropriate standard of review to be applied in determining the constitutionality of such a classification; and (C) when the appropriate
standard is applied does the specific minority admissions policy employed by the law school pass constitutional muster?' 6
8. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 16-19, 507 P.2d 1169, 1173-74 (1973).
9. Id. at 17-18, 507 P.2d at 1173-74.
10. The minority applicants included were Afro-Americans, Chicanos and American Indians.
11. 82 Wash. 2d at 21, 507 P.2d at 1175-76.
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
14. 82 Wash. 2d at 26, 507 P.2d at 1178.
15. Id. at 13, 507 P.2d at 1171.
16. Id. at 25, 507 P.2d at 1178. The Court finally added another question
concerning the tightneSs of fit between the ends and means. See note 21 infra.
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The first question-whether a racial classification is per se unconstitutional-was answered, after a rather careful discussion of the school
desegregation cases, in the negative. The crucial inquiry for the court
on the invalidation of racial classifications is whether the classification is
"invidious." Only racial classifications that are found to be invidious
are to be struck down. The preferential admissions program was found
not to be invidious since its purpose was to "bring together, rather than
separate, the races" and this purpose was achieved by "insuring a
reasonable representation of minority persons in the student body."'Even though the use of minority group membership as a factor
favoring admission was not an invidious classification which would be
per se unconstitutional, the court found that it was a racial classification,
so the state had to defend it by showing a compelling interest: "tt]he
burden is upon the law school to show that its consideration of race in
admitting students is necessary to the accomplishment of a compelling
The black letter statement of "new" equal protection
state interest."'
theory requires the state interest advanced for the use of a racial
classification to be of some nonracial character.' 9 Yet the Washington
court looked to what must be a racial purpose, the promotion of racial
integration, and held that the law school had carried its burden. The
state had an overriding interest in promoting racial integration in public
education generally, and more particularly in legal education:
The legal profession plays a critical role in the policy making
sector of our society, whether decisions be public or private, state
or local. That lawyers, in making and influencing these decisions,
should be cognizant of the views, needs and demands of all segments of society is a principle beyond dispute. The educational
interest of the state in producing a racially balanced student body
at the law school is compelling.
Finally, the shortage of minority attorneys-and consequently,
minority prosecutors, judges and public officials-constitutes an
undeniably compelling state interest. If minorities are to live
17. 82 Wash. 2d at 30, 507 P.2d at 1181.
18. Id. at 32, 507 P.2d at 1182.
19. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (miscegenation law struck down).
In Loving the Court indicated that racial classifications must be subjected to the most
rigid scrutiny: "[I]f they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to
the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial
discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate." Id.
at 11 (emphasis added). See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HAIv. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
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within the rule of20law, .they must enjoy equal representation within
our legal system.
The court then added a fourth consideration, the "tightness of fit"
of the classification to the justifying purpose. Since the purpose was to
increase the number of minority law students and to promote education,
the court, of course, found the use of a racial classification in the
admissions policy to be connected immediately and directly21 to the state
interest advanced and to be neither under nor overinclusive.
The discussion of the Washington court indicates that if a racial
classification is found to be invidious, it follows summarily that the
classification is per se unconstitutional. While this might be justified
as a straightforward rejection of the trial judge's analysis, still, in the
normal equal protection case, the finding of invidiousness follows, rather
than precedes, the entire analysis. Such a finding is made only when
the state has failed to carry its burden of justifying the racial classification as advancing a compelling state interest. However, the court
did go on to apply a compelling state interest analysis to the admissions preference. The use of race as a factor favoring admission
was justified by the interest of the state in promoting integration,
an interest the court found compelling. The problem is that both
the original finding of non-invidiousness and the finding of compelling state interest focus on the same thing-the purpose of the admissions program. No reason was given for considering the same subject
matter twice. Perhaps it is best to view this type of analysis as a
two-step process: some racial classifications are so clearly bad that no
justification could be advanced to dispel a finding of invidiousness. But
a racial classification somewhat less odious might still be struck down
because the justifications advanced for it were not compelling enough,
even though the classification is not facially invidious. The court did
not develop the distinction between a per se invidious classification and
one that might finally be found invidious for want of a sufficiently
compelling justification. The Washington court may have come close
to circumventing the whole "new" equal protection analysis because,
without regard to the niceties of that analysis, it found the use of
20. 82 Wash. 2d at 35, 507 P.2d at 1183-84. Reliance was placed on Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
21. 82 Wash. 2d at 35-36, 507 P.2d at 1183-84. However, Professor Morris's only
criticism is that the law school's program was slightly underinclusive in that Orientals
were not given preference. Further, the class might have been overinclusive by allowing
applicants to choose their class designation since there was no definition of minorities.
Morris, supranote 1, at 47-50.

19761

MANDATED PREFERENCES

race as a factor favoring minority admissions to law school to be
beneficial.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, but then, in a
per curiam opinion, vacated the case as moot. 22 Justice Brennan, joined
by Justices Douglas, White and Marshall, dissented on the mootness
issue. In a separate dissent, Justice Douglas alone reached the merits
and, in a troubled and troubling opinion, urged that the case be reversed
and remanded. He started with the proposition that the pfesent system of law school admissions, relying heavily, if not exclusively, on
numerical formulas derived from grade points and test scores, is by
no means constitutionally mandated:
The Equal Protection clause did not enact a requirement that
Law Schools employ as a sole criterion for admissions a formula
based upon the LSAT and undergraduate grades, nor does it proscribe law schools from evaluating an applicant's prior achievements in light of the barriers that he had to overcome.23
While acknowledging that there is no current test to predict barriers that
have been overcome and those that will be overcome in individual cases,
Justice Douglas would find such a test preferable since law schools
"would be making decisions on the basis of individual attributes, rather
than according a preference solely on the basis of race."24 The focus
should be on "the consideration of each application in a raciallyneutral
way but because the LSAT reflects questions touching on cultural backgrounds,"25 he would accept the separate processing for minority applications. Justice Douglas would accept a separate LSAT for minorities
or, more preferably, its abolition in favor of some "substitute tests . . .
to get a measure of an applicant's cultural background, perception,
ability to analyze, and his or her relation to groups."2 6 Quotas are out,
however:
The state . . . may not proceed by racial classifications to force
strict population equivalencies for every group in every oocupation,
overriding individual preferences. The Equal Protection clause
commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation in
order2 to satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organized. T
22. 416 U.S. 312 (1974). For the subsequent history of the case see DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 84 Wash. 2d 617, 529 P.2d 438 (1974), discussed in Pollak, supra note 7, at
506-11.
23. 416 U.S. at 331.
24. Id. at 332.
25. See id. at 334 (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 340.

27. Id. at 342.
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From all of this it is hard to see what the University of Washington
Law School did wrong. It simply treated minority applications separately, as Justice Douglas would allow because of the cultural bias of the
LSAT. It also had a common, though minimal, standard for both
applicant pools: to be considered, each applicant, minority or majority,
had to have a Predicted First Year Average (PFYA) that was passing.
Since most were projected to pass, that standard did not screen out many
applicants. Also, some majority applicants below a cutoff were summarily turned down, while all minority applicants were considered by
the full committee. What apparently upset Justice Douglas was that,
despite the common standard of a passing PFYA, the minority applicants were only judged in comparison with other minority applicants
and, likewise, the majority applicants were only compared with each
other. Thus, sufficient minority applicants were taken to make for
reasonable representation in the class. 28 And while, presumably the
"best qualified" minority applicants were accepted, the law school made
no comparison with the rejected majority applicants who, despite majority status, might be able to show they had overcome, and were in the
future likely to overcome, greater barriers than minority applicants who
were accepted. The hard questions under Justice Douglas' approach
are how does one evaluate these barriers he speaks of and, more directly,
what is the "value" in the admissions formula of membership in a
minority group as a barrier? If the value is an added number to the
formula that is the same for every minority applicant, is that "individualized" treatment? If this value is determined for each individual
minority applicant, what factors go into making the determination? It
might be suggested that economic status be a factor. While low economic status no doubt has a high correlation with minority group status,
they are obviously not identical. Even a black person of relatively high
economic status presumably has some claim that, without the handicap
of racial discrimination, his or her economic position would be much
better.2 Thus, to turn admissions preferences on economic differences
may be underinclusive, since it fails to consider the noneconomic, yet
real, impact of racial discrimination. Also, a program turning on
economic background limited to minority applicants would be underinclusive because it fails to include many majority applicants who are also
hindered by deprived economic circumstances. Should the preferential
program turn exclusively on economic background, with the use of race
28. Id. at 332-33.
29. See B. BrrTsER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 71-104 (1973).

19761

MANDATED PREFERENCES

325

as a classifying factor dropping out of the picture, the relationship
between the asserted purpose of integration and the implementing
means would be reduced. But also the level of judicial scrutiny would
test since economic classificabe reduced to the "old" rational relation
0
suspect.3
be
to
found
been
not
tions have
The opinion of Justice Douglas poses a very serious dilemma. On
one hand he disapproves of the present practices that dehumanize
individuals by transferring their human value into "objective," quantified numbers based on LSAT scores and grades. Lumping together
individuals by racial groups merely adds to his discomfort even though
such treatment is to the advantage of groups that historically have been
the victims of discrimination. On the other hand, his call for individualized treatment could easily lead to the kind of subjective determinations of access to education and the professions that formerly, if not
now, were even more restrictive to those of lower socio-economic background.
B. Other "Benign" Racial Classifications Are Constitutionally Permissible
Despite the uproar that continues over DeFunis, the Supreme
Court has on several occasions, without much resultant dispute, upheld
racial classifications. And the Court has done so without the use of the
strict scrutiny analysis employed by the Washington Supreme Court in
DeFunis. Rather, the classifications have been upheld under the rational basis test because of their benign character.
In 1966, in the case of Katzenbach v. Morgan,"' the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of section 4(e) of the 'Voting Rights
Act of 1965.2 The fifth amendment equal protection challenge 3 was
that the Act discriminated on the basis of alienage because it prohibited
states from denying the right to vote to any person not literate in
English who had completed the sixth grade in a foreign language
American-flag school, 4 but did not prohibit states from denying the
30. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
31. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See Redish, supra note 1, at 358-59; Developments, 82
HARv. L. REv., supranote 19, at 1107-11.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1970).
33. Since a federal statute was challenged, the analysis proceeded under the Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), wing of the fifth amendment that incorporates equal
protection as a restraint on federal government action.
34. An American-flag school is defined as a "public school in, or a private school
accredited by, any State or territory, the District of Columbia, or in the Commonwealth
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right to vote to other citizens not literate in English who had been
trained in foreign language schools beyond the territorial limits of the
United States. Because section 4(e) "does not restrict or deny the
franchise but in effect extends the franchise to persons who otherwise
would be denied it by state law,"35 the Court viewed it as a "reform"
of equal protection, 0 need
measure that, under the rational basis model
7
stroke.3
one
not cure all perceived evils in
In the 1973 term, the same term in which DeFuniswas declared to
be moot, the Court decided two cases that upheld the use of racial
classifications. In Lau v. Nichols, 8 1800 non-English speaking
Chinese students challenged the San Francisco school authorities for
failing to provide programs of instruction that would equalize their
educational opportunity with students who did speak English. Plaintiffs claimed they had been denied equal protection and further charged
the school authorities with discriminating on the basis of race in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 8" The Supreme Court,
by Justice Douglas, decided only the statutory claim and reversed the
Ninth Circuit, which had dismissed the suit on the ground that the
school authorities had no obligation to adopt programs to overcome the
educational handicaps students bring with them when they enter
school."0 Because these Chinese-speaking students were denied meaningful participation in the school programs that operated on the assumption that all students spoke English, the Court found racial discrimination within the terms of the regulations issued by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare pursuant to Title VI. 41 Because it was
not necessary to the decision, the Court did not decide plaintiffs' equal
protection claim-that the failure to provide some sort of bilingual
instruction to students who did not speak English violated their equal
right to education. Also, the Court did not discuss defendants' equal
of Puerto Rico in which the predominant classroom language was other than English."
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (2) (1970).
35. 384 U.S. at 657.
36. Id., citing Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (economic
equal protection case).
37. 384 U.S. at 657-58.
38. 414U.S. 563 (1974).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-4 (1970).
40. The Ninth Circuit had said: "Every student brings to the starting line of his
educational career different advantages and disadvantages caused in part by social,
economic and cultural background, created and continued completely apart from any
contribution by the school system." Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 797 (9th Cir. 1973),
rev'd, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
41. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.3-.13 (1973).
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protection-based defense, that the use of racial classifications by school
authorities violates the equal protection clause even though the purpose
is to equalize educational opportunity. So at most Lau stands as
implicit authority for the proposition that school authorities may now
make use of racial classifications in educational programs to promote
42
actual educational opportunity.
More significant is Morton v. Mancari,1a a case in which the Court
upheld an employment preference for Indians in the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. The statute under attack by non-Indians provided that "qualified Indians shall hereafter have the preference to appointments to
vacancies. '1 4 The Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Blackmun,
found the purpose of the preference was:
to give Indians a greater participation in their own self-government;
to further the Government's trust obligation toward the Indian
tribes; and to reduce the negative effect of having non-Indians administer matters that affect tribal life ....
Congress was well aware that the proposed preference would
result in employment disadvantages within the BIA for nonIndians. Not only was this displacement unavoidable if room were
to be made for Indians, but it was explicitly determined that gradual replacement of non-Indians with Indians within the Bureau
was
45
a desirable feature of the entire program for self-government.
In an attempt to limit the scope of the decision, Justice Blackmun first
discussed the "unique legal status" of Indian tribes in the Constitution,4 8
and the potential broad impact of a finding that special treatment of
Indians was invidious racial discrimination:
Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and
reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with the BIA,
single out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living near or on reservations. If these laws, derived from historical
relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were
42. The possibility exists that a court might find no racial classification involved
since some Chinese-speaking students were provided bilingual instruction while other
Chinese students were not. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974) (pregnancy versus nonpregnancy classification
not by sex since women were in both classifications).
43. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
44. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, §
12, 48 Stat. 986 (1934)).
45. 417 U.S. at 541-42, 544 (citations omitted).
46. U.S. CONS'r. art. I,§ 8,cl. 3 empowers Congress to "regulate Commerce . . .
with the Indian Tribes" and id. art. II,§ 2,cl. 2 gives the President the power, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties with such tribes.
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deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the
United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and
the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians
would be jeopardized. 41
Although it is incontrovertable that Indian tribes are given specialized
constitutional treatment, that Congress has legislated in regard to Indians, and that the courts have accepted that treatment, the preference
involved was not the result of any treaty or commerce with Indian tribes.
Instead, it was a preference within the federal government for employment that benefited individual qualified job applicants who happened to
be of Indian origin. A finding that such a preference is invidious
racial discrimination would not necessarily overthrow48 special arrangments with Indian tribes based on treaties or commerce.
More intriguing than the sui generis treatment of Indians, however,
is Justice Blackmun's attempt to escape the confines of traditional "new"
equal protection analysis by finding no racial classification at all in the
preference. Thus, a footnote49 tries to shoehorn the statute into a
narrower reading tied to Indian tribe status, rather than race, by referring to a BIA regulation limiting the preference to members of "federally recognized" tribes. While this does limit the sweep of the preference to fewer than all individuals who can be classified racially as Indians, the failure of the classification to be exactly coextensive with racial
lines does not make it less a racial classification.50
Though Justice Blackmun insists no racial classification or even a
racial preference is involved, in reality he appears to be relying on the
conclusion that the classification is not invidious and, therefore, should
be upheld, presumably under the rational basis standard. In other
words, the preference is well-intentioned and reasonably related to
permissible government goals:
[l]t is an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the
47. 417 U.S. at 552.
48. An example of the strict demarcation between the federal government and
Indian tribes is Jacobson v. Forest County Potawatomi Community, 389 F. Supp. 994
(E.D. Wis. 1974). A woman tribe member sued to strike down a tribal bylaw that
excluded women from holding office in the tribal council. The action was dismissed
because the "United States Constitution does not apply to any Indian tribe. Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376. . . (1896)." Id. at995.
49. 417 U.S. at 553 n.24.
50. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Court found racial
discrimination when 150 Chinese were denied permission to run laundries, while eighty
other Chinese were not similarly treated. But see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496
n.20 (1974), where the Court held that pregnancy discrimination did not constitute sex
discrimination because not all women became pregnant.
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cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA. more responsible to the needs of its constituent groups. It is directed to
participation by the governed in the governing agency ...
Furthermore, the preference applies only to employment in the Indian service. The preference does not cover any other government
agency or activity, and we need not consider the obviously more
difficult question that would be presented by a blanket exemption
for Indians from all civil service examinations. Here, the preference is reasonably and directly related to a legitimate, nonracially
based goal. This is the principal characteristic that51generally is absent from proscribed forms of racial discrimination.
In its attempt to limit the holding as closely as possible to Indians
at the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the opinion does show some discomfort
with preference programs. A facet that is not discussed is the impact
the preference has had on employment in the Bureau' The Court does
note that "[t]he percentage of Indians employed in the Bureau rose
from 34% in 1934 to 57% in 1972. This reversed the former downward trend . . . and was due, clearly, to the presence of the 1934
act." 2 With no discussion of the labor markets from which those
employees were drawn, the data are not particularly meaningful. If
most BIA employees are drawn from Indian reservations it would not be
unexpected, even without the preference, to have a high concentration of
Indians among those employees. But what if the BIA drew its employees from an area of low Indian population but, because of the preference, virtually all employees were Indians?53 The Court failed to
discuss whether this rational relation rhetoric could be used to uphold
the complete segregation in employment of a government agency.
In sum, despite all the controversy surrounding the University of
Washington Law School's use of race as a factor favoring admission of
minority group members to the school, such preferences have been
accepted in other contexts without the accompanying controversy and
they have been upheld as rational means to acceptable governmental
ends.
II.

A.

THE

DEVELOPMENT OF DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT ANALYSIS

Title VII and Employment Discrimination
This section will explore the development of discrimination analy-

51. 417 U.S. at 554.
52. Id. at 545.
53. The plaintiffs in Mancari were not employed on or near any Indian reservation.
Id. at 539 n.4.
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sis as it has evolved under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"
with the ultimate purpose of determining its applicability to law school
admissions under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. If that application is made, the result may well be that preferential admission programs like that found permissible in DeFunis will be
constitutionally mandatedas a remedy for discrimination.
Since fair employment practices legislation was first enacted, the
focus of interpretation has been on the word "discrimination." 55 Title
VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, creed,
color, sex, religion, or national origin. What has emerged and been
accepted for Title VII analysis is a "disproportionate impact" or "differential effect" approach, that looks to employment structures in terms of
their adverse consequences to minorities and women without regard to
purpose or facial neutrality. Once an employment policy is found to
bear more heavily on one or more groups protected by the legislation
than it does on unprotected groups, i.e. a "disproportionate impact" is
shown, the policy constitutes illegal discrimination unless the employer
proves it is justified. The starting point is a statistical determination of
the distribution of members of classes protected by the legislation (racial
minorities, women, etc.) throughout the employer's business. This is
followed by a comparison of those statistics with the distribution of the
minority workforce in appropriate labor markets available to the employer. If the minority representation in employment is less than would
be expected by the distribution in the labor market, the inquiry shifts to
an examination of the sources of job applicants, educational prerequisites, tests and other job qualifications to determine if such requirements
disproportionately exclude members of protected classes. If a differential impact exists, a prima facie case is established that must be rebutted
by a showing that the policy is justified by business necessity.
The watershed case establishing this "adverse impact" definition of
discrimination is Griggs v. Duke Power Co."6 Prior to the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Duke Power had a typical "Souther" system of strict racial segregation in job classifications: black employees were relegated to the lowest paying, lowest status, dead end jobs
54. 42 U.S.C. 2000e to e-17 (Supp. 1972).

55. The discussion contained in this section was originally and more extensively
developed in Sullivan and Zimmer, The South Carolina Human Affairs Law: Two Steps
Forward, One Step Back?, 27 S.C.L. REV. 1 (1975).
56. 401 U.S. 424 (1971), rev'g in part 420 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1970), af'g in part
and rev'g in part 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
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in the labor department. They were not allowed to transfer into the
four all-white departments-coal handling, operations, maintenance,
and laboratory and tests. Whites were never assigned to the labor
department. After 1955, all employees entering the white departments
were required to have high school diplomas. When Title VII became
effective in 1965, the company also required all employees entering the
formerly all-white departments to pass two standard industrial tests, the
Wonderlic Personnel Test, which purports to measure general intelligence, and the Bennett Mechanical Test. In order to transfer into a
different department, employees were required after 196:5 to have high
school diplomas. This diploma requirement was dropped in response
to protests by white employees without diplomas who were employed
before the requirement was imposed. 7
The Griggs case started as a class action 8 brought by black
employees at Duke's Dan River Station who were still in the labor
department by virtue of racial assignment. The district court upheld
the company's transfer policy on the basis of an "evil motive" test, 59
since the company had, by the time of decision, transferred the three
blacks who had met the transfer requirement. 60 Unlike the district
' concourt, the Fourth Circuit applied the second, "equal treatment,"61
cept of discrimination, and found that Title VII had been violated.
Some white employees hired before the diploma requirement was
imposed in 1955 had been able over the years to transfer and be
promoted to better jobs, while black employees hired before 1955 were
confined to the labor department. Since both groups of employees were
similarly situated, in that both lacked high school diplomas, "equal
treatment" required that the blacks hired before 1955 be transferred and
promoted without regard to the diploma or testing requirement. 62 However, blacks hired after 1955 without high school diplomas had not been
57. Id. at 427.
58. 292 F. Supp. 243,244 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
59. See id. at 249-51. Note that "evil motive" can be used in two senses. The first
is the connotation of saying, "I am going to mistreat you because you are black." The
second establishes that intent just as clearly by adoption of a rule that on its face limits
opportunities for blacks. Thus the Duke Power rule that blacks could not transfer
because they were black was also indicative of evil motive.
60. Id. at 247. Three of fourteen blacks had high school diplomas. One was
transferred to coal handling after EEOC charges had been filed. 401 U.S. at 427 n.2.
The other two were promoted while the suit was pending. 420 F.2d at 1229.
61. 420 F.2d 1225, 1230-35 (4th Cir. 1970). "Equal treatment" is essentially the
"color-blind" test subscribed to by the first Justice Harlan in his dissent to Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
62. 420 F.2d at 1230-31.
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denied equal treatment: since all whites hired after 1955 had diplomas,
they were not similarly situated to the blacks. Foreshadowing the
Supreme Court's opinion, Judge Sobeloff dissented, saying that "Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees
6' 3
into discriminatory patterns that existed before the act.
Neither the Fourth Circuit nor the district court found anything
discriminatory about the diploma and testing requirements. The district court found them to be rational management techniques for securing the best-qualified employees."4 Applying the "evil motive" view of
discrimination, the Fourth Circuit found no violation, since the educational requirement was adopted for the legitimate business purpose of
raising general qualifications "with no intention to discriminate against
Negro employees who might be hired after the adoption of the educa'
Since the tests had been professionally develtional requirement." 65
oped and no evidence was adduced of discrimination in administration
or scoring, no violation of the "equal treatment" standard was found. 8
Thus, the testing requirement was held valid even though there was no
showing that scoring well on the test related to good performance on the
job.67

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion6 8 authored by Chief
Justice Burger, adopted the "differential impact" or "adverse effect"
view of discrimination-once it is established that an employment practice statistically disqualifies proportionately more members of a protected group than of the majority group, the employer has the burden of
establishing that the practice is necessary for the business:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain
from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated
in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot
be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices ....
63. Id. at 1247 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting), quoting Judge Butzner in Quarles v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968).
64. 292 F. Supp. at 248, 250.
65. 420 F.2d at 1232.
66. Id. at 1233.
67. Id. at 1235.
68. Justice Brennan took no part in the case. 401 U.S. at 425.
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The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited. 69
The Court made clear that Title VII has broader scope than merely
prohibiting evil motive discrimination:
The Court of Appeals held that the Company had adopted
the diploma and test requirements without any "intention to discriminate against Negro employees." 420 F.2d at 1232. We do
not suggest that either the District Court or the Court of Appeals
erred in examining the employer's intent; but good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as "built-in headwinds"
for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.
• . . Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.
More than that, Congress has placed on the employer the burden
of showing that any given requirement Tmust have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.
The basis for the Courts decision that the testing and diploma
requirements had a differential impact on blacks apparently lay in
judicial notice of 1960 census figures and several decisions of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The high school
diploma requirement was found to have a more substantial restrictive
effect on blacks than on whites, since in North Carolina, at the time of
the 1960 census, thirty-four percent of white males had completed high
school while only twelve percent of black males had done so. 71 There
was no evidence that the Dan River plant drew its employees from the
entire geographic area of North Carolina or that applicants for Duke
Power jobs reflected a cross section of North Carolina's population.
Further, the EEOC, in two cases not involving Duke Power, relied on
the general literature concerning testing and, without resort to expert
witnesses, found that the Wonderlic and Bennett tests had a differential
impact on blacks because fifty-eight percent of whites passed the test as
compared with only six percent of blacks.72 The Supreme Court in
69. Id. at 429-31.
70. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
71. Id. at 430 n.6, citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1 U.S. CENSUS OF
POPULATION: 1960, pt. 35, Table 47.
72. CCH EMPL. PaAC. GUIDE
17.304.53 (EEOC 1970); id. 11 6139 (EEOC
1966).
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Griggs took judicial notice of, and accepted, these findings as a matter
of law.
These generalized statistics, accepted by judicial notice, were sufficient to shift the burden to the employer to justify the use of the test and
diploma requirements. If justification could be established the requirements would stand, even though they posed more of a restriction to the
employment opportunities of blacks than whites. 4 Since the testing
and diploma requirements had been adopted to "generally improve" the
qualifications of the work force, Duke Power could not show that they
were related to the performance of particular jobs at the plant." Alihough the lower courts had not required a showing of job-relatedness, it
seems unlikely that the company could have produced such proof, at
least for the lower level jobs. Since the next department up the ladder
from the labor department was coal handling, it is probable that qualifications necessary to be a sweeper in the former would be similar to those
needed to be a shoveler in the latter. Further, by requiring that
employees' tests be empirically validated, the Court made clear that the
"business necessity" defense will not be found merely on the basis of
unsubstantiated company testimony. In Griggs the only empirical evidence in the record indicated that those employees hired before 1955
who had not completed high school or taken the tests had performed
satisfactorily and had made progress in the departments where the testing and diploma requirements had subsequently been imposed. 6
Several opinions rendered after Griggs permit further refinements
of our insight into the meaning of "adverse effect" discrimination. If
Griggs establishes that a prima facie case may be made out by comparing minority and majority disqualification rates with respect to particu73. 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
74. While Title VII was intended to remove artificial restrictions put in the path of
protected groups, the Court said:
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job to every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not command that any
person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination,
or because he is a member of a minority group. Discriminatory preferences
for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has
proscribed.
. . . The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.
Id. at 430-31.
75. Id. at 431.
76. Id. at 431-32. The notion that tests must be validated, that is, have an
empirical basis for concluding that a good score predicts good performance on the job, is
a longstanding tenet of the testing profession that was adopted in the EEOC Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1974).
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lar employment requirements, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green7 7

suggests that discrimination might be prima facie proven merely by
comparing protected class representation in the general population with
representation in the employer's work force.78 The Court wrote: "The
District Court may, for example, determine, after reasonable discovery

that 'the [racial] composition of defendant's labor force is itself restrictive or reflective of exclusionary practices.' "' The Court cited Professor
Blumrosen's provocative article, 0 in which the author rejects the notion
that Griggs ought to be limited to situations where particular employment policies or practices can be pointed out as the cause of the

differential impact:
This approach would produce the ultimate frustration of
piecemeal litigation concerning the employer's hiring process, and
would require successive litigation over each stage in the hiring and
employment process. This result would stultify the implementation
of Title VII. It was carefully avoided by the Supreme Court
[in Griggs].8 1

Green may be read as approving, or at least as holding open, prima facie
proof of employment discrimination by a comparison between demographic statistics and the employer's work force.
This analysis is not undercut by the fact that the Green Court,
immediately after citing Blumrosen with apparent approval, then writes:
"We caution that such general determinations, while helpful, may not be
in and of themselves controlling as to an individualized hiring decision,

particularly in the presence of an otherwise justifiable reason for refusing to rehire. 8 2 Presumably, the Court was limiting the use of statistics
in two ways. First, in line with Griggs, such data is only prima facie.
proof, not conclusive.83 Secondly, the Green Court was attempting to
77. 411 U.S.792 (1973).
78. See Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences Under Title'
VII, 59 VA. L. REv. 463 (1973).
79. 411 U.S. at 805 n.19.
80. Blumrosen, Strangersin Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and The Concept
of Employment Discrimination,71 MicE. L REv. 59 (1972).
81. Id.at92.
82. 411 U.S. at 805 n.19.
83. Although the Green Court did not specifically advert to the case which presaged
both Griggs and Green, Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th
Cir. 1970), it has been criticized for holding that demographic disparities in work force
representation (in Parham, blacks constituted only two percent of the defendant's labor
force in an area where they comprised twenty percent of the population) could establish
discrimination conclusively. See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HA. L. REv. 1109, 1154 (1971).
In light of that criticism even the Eighth Circuit appears to have abandoned the use of
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stress that making out a differential impact case does not necessarily
establish illegal discrimination with respect to particular individuals. For
example, although an invalid test which disqualifies a number of blacks
may be enjoined, it does not necessarily follow that every black applicant rejected for failing to pass the test should receive back pay. Some
may not be qualified for the job even when assessed under legitimate,
nondiscriminatory standards. In any event, it seems clear that the
qualifying language used by the Green Court does not mark a retreat
from its prior suggestion that demographic data may be used to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination.
Another case that bears on the structure of a prima facie case is
Espinoza v. FarahManufacturing Co., Inc.84 The Supreme Court held
that failing to hire a person because she is not a United States citizen is
not discrimination based on national origin where it does not have the
"purpose or effect" of discrimination on that basis. In so holding, the
Court looked to employment statistics which showed that persons of
Mexican ancestry, all of whom were United States citizens, made up
more than ninety-six percent of the employees at the company's San
Antonio, Texas plant. Since there was no evidence of evil motive, the
citizenship requirement did not have as its purpose national origin
discrimination. And, in view of the employment data, there was no
disproportionate impact. Thus, the Court wrote: "[w]hile statistics
such as these do not automatically shield an employer from a charge of
unlawful discrimination, the plain fact of the matter is that Farah does
not discriminate against persons of Mexican national origin with respect
to employment in the job Mrs. Espinoza sought. ' 85 While Espinoza
might be interpreted as requiring plaintiffs to show a differential impact
at the particular employer's work place, there is an alternate and better
view. If a plaintiff's prima facie case has been established by showing a
differential impact based on general demographic statistics, a defendant
can rebut the case by showing that his particular work force differs from
the general, so that the challenged practice has no differential impact. 80
demographic statistics per se. See Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157
(8th Cir. 1971), where particularly incriminating statistics were held to be merely
evidentiary. See also Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238, 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
84. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
85. Id. at 93.

86. While the plaintiff in Espinoza relied on the EEOC Guidelines to establish her
case, several cases have taken the approach suggested here. See Cooper v. Philip Morris,
9 E.P.D. 9929 (D. Ky. 1974); Park v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 8 E.P.D. 9732
(N.D. Ohio 1974).
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The more recent cases have begun to explore the scope of defenses
available to employers, which was left unclear in Griggs. At one point
the Griggs Court spoke of Title VII as barring "artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment," 87 perhaps implying that barriers
which do not so qualify are legal. Shortly thereafter, the opinion
describes the "touchstone" of legality as "business necessity." But in
the immediately following sentence, the validating justification is formulated in terms of being "related to job performance."88
Three Supreme Court opinions are relevant to the treatment of
defenses available to an employer. First, there is the implication derived from Espinoza that an employer may show that no differential
impact exists. Second, and more importantly, the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 9 suggests either that "business necessity" is a defense that can be established in more ways than by
empirically demonstrating job-relatedness, or that there exist employer
defenaeso disedri-maioncharges in addition to a showing of business
necessity. Green involved McDonnell Douglas' refusal to rehire a former
employee on the ground that he had been convicted of an unlawful
"stall-in" and had engaged in an unlawful "lock-in," both as part of a
civil rights protest against the employer. The stall-in involved the use of
cars to block access to the plant during rush hour, while the lock-in
involved padlocking the exits to the employer's office building.90 Green
pleaded guilty to obstructing traffic for the "stall-in." He was not
arrested for the "lock-in," although he was chairman of the group that
performed it and knew that it would be done. 1 Shortly after these
events, the company advertised for mechanics. Green, who had been a
mechanic for the company until he had been laid off allegedly for
economic reasons, applied, but was rejected because of his participation
in the unlawful activities.92
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Powell, attempted to resolve the difficulties of the lower courts by defining
"the order and allocation of proof in a private, single plaintiff action
challenging employment discrimination," 93 involving individual employ87. 401U.S. at 431.
88. id.
89. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
90. Id. at 794-96.
91. Id. at 795 & n.3.
92. Id. at 796.
93. Id. at 800.
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under
the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This
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ment decisions rather than general practices. Green had made out a
prima facie case: he was a black who had performed satisfactorily as a
McDonnell mechanic-the job that remained open after the company
refused to rehire him. The burden then shifted to the employer
to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [respondent's] rejection. We need not attempt in the instant case to
detail every matter which fairly could be recognized as a reasonable basis for refusal to hire. Here petitioner has assigned re-

spondent's participation in unlawful conduct against it as a cause
for his rejection. We think that this suffices to discharge petitioner's burden of proof at this 9stage
and to meet respondent's
4
prima facie case of discrimination.
Thus, the Court held that the reasons advanced by McDonnell for not
rehiring Green-participation in unlawful civil rights tactics aimed at
the company-rebutted the plaintiffs prima facie case. The Court then
remanded on the ground that Green could still prevail by showing that
McDonnell Douglas' decision was actually a pretext for a refusal to hire
for discriminatory reasons.95 The "pretext" notion clearly embraces
evil-motive discrimination. Green, who had protested his original layoff as racially discriminatory, might show that the company's prior
treatment of him was discriminatory, as by statements of management
representatives that demonstrate racial prejudice. Perhaps not so obviously, Green could also show pretext by demonstrating that he had not
been treated equally, as by proving that white employees who had
engaged in unlawful acts against the employer of comparable seriousness were retained or rehired."
Finally, and most interestingly, the Court indicated that evidence
showing a Griggs-type case, a general pattern of disproportionate impact, would be relevant to the plaintiff's attempt to prove pretext:
"statistics as to petitioner's employment policy and practice may be
helpful to a determination of whether petitioner's refusal to rehire
respondent in this case conformed to a general pattern of discrimination
may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that
he
applied and
forqualifications,
a job for which
the rejected;
employerand
was(iv)seeking
applicants;
(iii) was
that, qualified
despite his
he was
that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued
to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802.
94. Id. at 802-03 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 807.
96. Id. at 804. Presumably the most likely cases would arise from treatment of
employees involved in traditional union activities, including striking and picketing, in
furtherance of collective bargaining.
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against blacks. 97 If the Court was speaking advisedly, the result of
Green is certainly startling: a defendant who, evenhandedly and in
perfect good faith, fires an employee for an objectively legitimate reason
may still be held to have acted only "pretextually" if he is guilty of
disproportionate impact discrimination in his general hiring practices. It
seems strange in this situation to invalidate an employer's action on the
ground that it is a "pretext." But perhaps even stranger is the interaction
of Green and Griggs. Suppose Green is able to make out a Griggs case
of disproportionate impact. Would he then be entitled to relief, including rehiring, even though the employer has a reason for not rehiring him
that was strong enough in the first instance to rebut plaintiff's prima
facie case? Carried to its logical extreme, such a rule would mean that
an employer guilty of Griggs-type discrimination could not fire or refuse
to hire any member of a protected class for any reason whatsoever.
That rule would, in turn, displace Green itself: no plaintiff would be
foolish enough to bring a Green case when a Griggs approach is
available, as it usually will be.
The Green Court, in a footnote, seemed to stop short of such an
extreme position. While authorizing the use of statistics to support a
finding that the racial "composition of defendant's labor force is itself
reflective of restrictive or exclusionary practices,"98 the opinion cautioned that "such general determinations, while helpful, may not be in
and of themselves controlling as to an individualized hiring decision,
particularly in the presence of an otherwise justifiable reason for refusing to rehire." 9 Apparently, making out a Griggs case will not by itself
counteract McDonnell's rebuttal of Green's prima facie case. Rather, a
Griggs case may be combined with other evidence that might by itself be
inconclusive in order to establish pretext.
In any event, Green seems to establish an employer defense to
Griggs-type cases that is not based on empirical validation of jobrelatedness. Justice Powell, in describing the scope of defense available
to the company, relied on the "disloyalty" doctrine developed under the
National Labor Relations Act.100 That doctrine is not founded on
97. Id. at 808.
98. Id. at 805 n.19, quoting Blumrosen, supranote 80, at 92.
99. Id.
100. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970). NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306
U.S. 240 (1939), set out the core concept: an employer need not continue to employ
persons who had seized the employer's property in what is determined to be an illegal
sitdown strike. The NLRA was not "intended to compel employers to retain persons in
their employ regardless of their unlawful conduct,-to invest those who go on strike with
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empirical evidence but the Court accepted it, saying that once a prima
facie case had been made out the "burden then must shift to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
employee's rejection."''1 1 Perhaps the best way to read Green is to see it
as establishing a third step in a Griggs analysis, available to the employer only to limit the remedies against it after it has lost on the first two
steps. Thus, if an employer fails to bring forth specific statistics to
rebut plaintiff's prima facie case, as allowed in Espinoza, and is also
unable to establish job-relatedness with empirical evidence according to
Griggs, then the employer may still attempt to deny relief to individual
plaintiffs based on their disloyalty or any other "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." In Green the Court may have established the foundation for such a distinction by distinguishing that case from Griggs as a
rather than
single plaintiff action focusing on the conduct of the plaintiff
02
VH.
Title
by
protected
class
a
of
his status as a member
A hypothetical may illuminate the importance of this distinction.
Assume plaintiffs represent a protected class of blacks and women in a
Griggs-style class action against an employer, and that they establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. If the employer can neither rebut
the prima facie case with statistics like those in Espinoza nor establish
empirically a business justification for the differential impact its policies
have on protected groups, the class is entitled to relief. But Green
suggests that class relief does not necessarily mean relief for every
member of the class. At this level, the employer can raise the Green
defense to determine whether particular members of the class should be
denied relief because of their allegedly illegal or disloyal conduct. Even
an immunity from discharge for acts of trespass or violence against the employer's
property.

. .

."

Id. at 255.

Since Fansteel the disloyalty doctrine has been developed

to cover situations beyond physical violence aimed at the employer's property, to include
participation in campaigns designed to disparage the employer's products or his status in
the community. The broadest scope given the disloyalty defense is in NLRB v. Local
1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953). The unionized technicians of WBTV, Charlotte,
North Carolina, picketed the station in their off-duty hours to further their collective
bargaining demands. They also distributed handbills which made no reference to a labor
controversy, union or collective bargaining, but did attack the television station's lack of
live local programming. The handbill insinuated that the company gave Charlotte
second-class service because the management thought Charlotte was a second-class city.
Id. at 468. The Supreme Court upheld the discharge meted out to the participants
saying, "[tihere is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty
to his employer." Id. at 472.
101. 411 U.S. at 802.
102. The Court further emphasized the individualized nature of the case by distinguishing Green's conduct as unlawful conduct aimed at the employer rather than
unlawful conduct not directed against the particular employer. Id. at 803 n.17.
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if shown by the employer to be disloyal, individual plaintiffs can still
prevail under Green if they can establish that the employer's conduct is a
mere pretext for discrimination. It is not clear what other individualized defenses might be available to employers, but the possibilities are
obvious. For example, not every black barred from employment by
education or testing requirements is qualified; an employer may be able
to avoid back pay liability as to individuals who are not qualified under
legitimate, nondiscriminatory standards.
The final case, Albemarle Paper Co. v._Moody, °3 supports the
notion that the scope of defenses available to employers in Title VII
cases ought to be narrowly construed. Aside from placing limits on
the discretion of courts to deny back pay in Title VII cases, the Court
struck down an attempt to validate employment tests because the validation study failed to conform to the requirements of the EEOC Guidelines for testing. In dicta restating the basic Griggs structure of litigation, the Court appeared to open the way for plaintiffs to win, despite the
employer's showing of job relatedness, by proving that the employer
could have used hiring policies that had less drastic impact on classes
protected by the statute:
If an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests
are "job related," it remains open to the complaining party to show
that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable
racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in
"efficient and trustworthy workmanship." . . . Such a showing
would be evidence that the employer
was using its tests merely as
04
a "pretext" for discrimination.1
While the Court quotes McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, this notion
of "less drastic means" comes from the Fourth Circuit's narrow description of the business necessity defense in Robinson v. LorrilardCorp. 0 5
[T]he applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business
purpose for adhering to a challenged practice. The test is whether
there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the
practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling
to override any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and
103. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
104. Id. at 425. See Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974), which proposed that
the business necessity test focus on whether the employer had available alternatives with
less drastic impact on protected classes.

105. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
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there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practice which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced,
or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial impact.10
Viewing the existence of "less drastic means" as establishing a "pretext"
to be shown by plaintiffs to overcome an otherwise valid business
necessity defense was originated by Justice Stewart in Albemarle
07
Paper.1
While the final pattern of discrimination analysis has yet to emerge,
it is presently clear that plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing a differential impact on classes of employees
protected by Title VII. Employers then must carry the burden of
showing a business necessity that justifies the policies causing the differential impact.
B.

DisproportionateImpact Analysis in PublicEmployment

Before public employees were brought within the coverage of Title
courts dealt with equal protection challenges to allegedly discriminatory public employment policies by attempting to apply traditional strict judicial scrutiny language. That having proved unsatisfactory, courts looked to Title VII discrimination analysis and incorporated
it as a wing of equal protection doctrine applicable to public employment. This historical development is important to the thesis developed
here, because it represents one bridge between Title VII and equal
protection. More importantly, the ease with which that incorporation
took place shows that courts might well extend the application of
employment discrimination analysis to equal protection cases dealing
with nonemployment situations, including challenges by minorities to
law school admissions policies.
Chance v. Board of Examiners"0 involved the successful equal
protection challenge by blacks and Puerto Ricans to the use of exams in
selecting school administrators in New York City on the ground that the
exams were racially discriminatory. Since only 1.4 percent of the
principals and 7.2 percent of the assistant principals were black or
Puerto Rican, the district court ordered the parties to prepare a survey
V]I,108

I

106. Id. at 798.

07. 422 U.S. at 425.
108. Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e(a) (1974)).
109. 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), afl'd, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
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comparing passing rates of the different groups involved. The survey
covered a seven year time span in which fifty different examinations
were given to 6,000 applicants and it showed overall that "white candidates passed at almost 1% times the rate of Black and Puerto Rican
candidates."1 10 From these statistics the district judge applied a Griggs
analysis and found a prima facie case of discrimination. The court then
found that the defendant had failed to carry its burden of making a
"strong showing" that the tests were job-related, since the Board failed
to establish that the exams were "valid as to content, much less to
predictiveness.""'l
In affirming, the Second Circuit tried with difficulty to fit the case
into more general equal protection analysis:
Concededly, this case does not involve intentionally discriminatory
legislation, cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), or even a
neutral legislative scheme applied in an intentionally discriminatory
manner, see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Nonetheless, we do not believe that the protection afforded racial minorities by the fourteenth amendment is exhausted by those two possibilities. As already indicated, the district court found that the
Board's examinations have a significant and substantial discriminatory impact on black and Puerto Rican applicants. That harsh
racial impact, even if unintended, amounts to an invidious de facto
classification that cannot be ignored or answered with a shrug. At
the very least, the Constitution requires that state action spawning
such a 12classification "be justified by legitimate state considerations."1
The defendant argued that plaintiff's showing of de facto discrimination should be governed by the rational relation test of judicial
scrutiny,' and that the exams ought to be upheld as rational. Because the tests were struck down, the trial court must have erroneously
applied the strict scrutiny test. The Second Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court had not applied strict scrutiny "to a case such as this, in
which the allegedly unconstitutional action unintentionally resulted in
discriminatory effects. . . . Manifestly, the question whether that test
should be applied to de facto discrimination classifications is a difficult
one . . . ,,."The appeals court then avoided the issue by saying that
the question whether the exams were job-related would be answered
110. Id.at210.
111. Id. at219.
112. 458 F.2d at 1175-76.
113. E.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
114. 458 F.2d at 1177 (citations omitted).
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the same way under either test since, "the present examinations were not
found to be job-related and thus are 'wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a valid state objective.' "11M
While this conclusion might be supported by claiming that the
failure of the Board of Examiners to follow professional validation
standards"1 is irrational, it is still true that most test users have not
validated their tests to determine if they are job-related. The other way
to justify the Second Circuit's conclusion is that by citing Reed v.
Reed," ' the court was foreshadowing the "means scrutiny" model of
equal protection subsequently developed by Professor Gunther."18
The First Circuit avoided the difficulty the Second Circuit had in
squeezing employment discrimination cases into equal protection analysis by simply applying Griggs as one wing of equal protection analysis.
In Castro v. Beecher," 9 a police recruitment case, the plaintiffs showed
that only 2.3 percent of Boston police were black in a city population
that was over sixteen percent black. A challenged test screened out
ninety percent of Spanish applicants and seventy-five percent of black
applicants, but only 35 percent of majority group members. Since the
exam had not been shown to be job-related, the court found an equal
protection violation: "The public employer must, we think, in order to
justify the use of a means of selection shown to have a racially disproportionate impact, demonstrate that the means is in fact substantially
related to job performance.' 120 Since the burden was put on the state
to make a showing of job-relatedness rather than merely to establish that
the relationship was reasonable, the First Circuit did not appear to apply
traditional equal protection analysis. Yet the court disclaimed the use
of new equal protection, since that would entail proof of absence of
alternative means-a test that the court thought would require the use
of racial quotas and compensatory programs to train minority candi2
dates.' 1
115. Id. at 1177, quoting Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970), citing Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).

116. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS (1974).
117. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (preference for males in selection of estate administrator
struck down).
118. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
119. 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
120. Id. at 732.
121. Id.at733.
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In Vulcan Society v. Civil Service Commission,122 a firefighter
case, Chief Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit adopted the language
of "racially disproportionate impact" from Castro in place of the "de
facto discrimination" language of Chance to describe the first step in
discrimination analysis. The reason for the change was to make clear
that a finding of de facto discrimination or racially disproportionate
impact was not dispositive of the case. 123 All that such a finding did
was shift the burden to the state to show that the tests were job-related.
Only if the state failed to carry its burden-the burden of going forward
and of persuasion-would there be a finding of illegal or invidious
discrimination. As to the standard imposed on the defense, the court
cited the language in Castro, Griggs and Green, that examinations must
be "shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used.' 2 4 Chief Judge Friendly found
further support for the use of the Griggs analysis in public employment
equal protection cases in the Supreme Court's approving citation to both
Title VII and equal protection cases in Green: "The Court...
implicitly recognized that there is no significant distinction in the
general job-relatedness requirement under either Title VII or §
1983 ...

"12

In sum, the basic Griggs structure of discrimination analysis has become the accepted approach in equal protection challenges -to public
employment policies. That essential identity is quite practical and is
presumably stable, since Title, VII has now been extended to public employment. While the Second Circuit in Chance fought to incorporate
discrimination analysis into the traditional two-tier equal protection approach, it abandoned that attempt in Vulcan Society. And so, at least
for public employment, discrimination analysis operates as an independent wing of equal protection. The only result of the accommodation of
Title VII discrimination analysis with equal protection may be to achieve
uniformity now that Title VII has been extended to public employees.
But there may be more to it than that. The cases show that at least in
employment situations courts have found it easy and comfortable to
incorporate discrimination analysis into the equal protection clause. But
in a recent case, Tyler v. Vickery,12 6 the Fifth Circuit refused to apply
discrimination analysis to an equal protection challenge to the Georgia
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 391 & n.4.
Id. at 394, quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
Id. at 394-95 n.9.
517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975) (Adams, J., dissenting).
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bar examination. The court recognized that to adopt such an approach
would result in finding the bar exam unconstitutional "[s]ince it is
undisputed that the Georgia bar examination has greater impact on
black applicants than on whites and has never been the subject of a
professional validation study." 127 Three reasons were .given for not
applying discrimination analysis. First, the public employment cases
were distinguished as situations in which the incorporation of such an
analysis was necessary to maintain symmetry between private employment governed by Title VII and public employment, especially since
Title VII was amended to be applicable to public employment cases
subsequently arising. Secondly, the court relied on its previous per
curiam affirmance of a district court decision that did not follow the
public employment cases of the other circuits. 128 Thirdly, reliance was
placed on Geduldig v. Aiello, 1 29 where the Supreme Court could have,
but did not, apply Title VII authority to an equal protection claim of
gender discrimination. The Fifth Circuit did not consider the cases
discussed in the next section of this article, which trace the independent
development of litigation techniques similar to disproportionate impact
analysis, but which have arisen in the school segregation context.
C. DisproportionateImpact Analysis Beyond Employment
(1) Race Cases Up to Brown I.
There has recently emerged in school segregation cases a method of
analysis or a technique for litigation that is, if not identical, very similar
to the discrimination analysis developed in employment cases. This
section will first explore the historical development of the fourteenth
amendment to show that the purpose of the amendment today is the
promotion of integration. Secondly, it will concentrate on the most
recent school segregation cases to show that the distinction between de
facto and de jure segregation has lost its legal significance. In place of
that distinction there is a two-step structure of litigation that allows
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of segregation by statistically
showing that most students in most schools are in racially identifiable
atmospheres. To resist a finding of unconstitutional segregation school
127. Id. at 1096.
128. Allen v. City of Mobile, 466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), afj'g 331
F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Ala. 1971) (challenging the constitutionality of an exam used fof
police promotions).
129. 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (exclusion from state employment disability benefits of
disabilities related to normal pregnancy not a violation of equal protection).
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authorities must carry the burden of showing that the segregation oc-

curred despite their best efforts to prevent it.
From the colonial years through at least the 1954 decision in
Brown v. Board of Education,130 some colonies and then states enacted
elaborate codes to maintain first the slave system and then racial segregation. An early example of such a law is the 1740 South Carolina

slave code, entitled, "An act for the better Ordering and Governing
Negroes and other Slaves in this Province."'

31

Essentially it provides

that, except for then freed slaves, blacks were chattels, the
property of white owners.' - There was an in rem, personal
action recognized in which blacks could go into court to claim
were free, but only if they could get some free person to

personal
property
that they
be their

guardian for the purposes of the action.'1 3 In other words, blacks were

presumed to be slaves lacking the capacity to go into court on their own
behalf.

The extent of the legal controls designed to differentiate slave

from free by keeping slaves in a manifestly inferior position extended
even to such things as apparel. Section 40 of the code set out the kind
and quality of apparel slaves could wear and provided that every free
4
person was required to strip slaves of any nonconforming attire.1

The state law systems of slavery were accepted by. the original

Constitution. For the purpose of allocating congressional representatives and of imposing direct taxes, slaves were counted as three-fifths of
130. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
131. 7 S.C. Stat. 397 (McCord ed. 1740).
132. [A]l negroes and Indians . . .mulattos or muslizoes who now are, or
shall hereafter be, in this Province, and all of their issue . . .shall be .. .
absolute slaves, and shall follow the condition of the mother and shall be
deemed .. .to be chattels personal, in the hands of their owners, . . .to all
intents, constructions, and purposes whatsoever ....
Id. § 1.
133. Id.
134. That no owner or proprietor of any negro slave, or other slave, (except
livery men and boys) shall permit or suffer such negro or other slave, to have
or wear any sort of apparel whatsoever, finer, other, or of greater value than
negro cloth, duffils, kerseys, osnabrigs, blue linen, check linen or coarse garlix,
or callicoes, checked cottons, or Scotch plaids, under the pain of forfeiting all
and every such apparel and garment. . . and all and every constable and other
persons are hereby authorized, empowered and required, when and as often as
they shall find any such negro slave, or other slave, having or wearing any
sort of garment or apparel whatsoever, finer, [than the above-enumerated
kinds] .. .to seize and take away the same, to his or their own use, benefit
and behoof; any law, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding. Provided always, that if any owner. . . shall think the garment or apparel of his
said slave not liable to forfeiture . . . he may apply to any neighboring justice
of the peace, who is hereby authorized and empowered to determine any difference or dispute that shall happen thereupon, according to the true intent and
meaning of this Act.
Id. § 40.
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free people. 135 Not only did the original Constitution have incorporated
into it a legal property system based on the enslavement of blacks, but
the Supreme Court, in Dred Scott v. Sandford,'3" held that, slave or free,
black people were not citizens of the United States entitled to the
protection of the Constitution. They could not become United States
citizens even if they were awarded full citizenship by a state. In the
Supreme Court's view there were two constitutional classes of citizens,
white and black.
Come the Civil War, the Emancipation Proclamation and the
Reconstruction period, the trend was to eliminate the slavery system and
to recognize legally the fundamental humanity of blacks. The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments, as well as national civil
rights legislation,1 31 were enacted to restructure our state laws to that
end. There never has been doubt that the central purpose for enacting
the Civil War amendments was to protect the legal rights of black
citizens. In the Slaughter-House Cases,'38 which restricted the scope of
the fourteenth amendment to that purpose, the Supreme Court said:
[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose
found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without
which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of
that freedom, and the protection of the newly made freeman and
citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over him. It is true that only the fifteenth
amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by speaking of his color
and his slavery. But it is just as true that each of the other articles
was addressed to the grievances of that race, and designed to
remedy them as the fifteenth.' 39
Although the thirteenth amendment had outlawed slavery and had
struck down such laws as the South Carolina slave code, the southern
states enacted "black codes" that reimposed the same kind of social,
economic, and political disabilities formerly attached to the slave system.
It was the existence of such laws that provided part of the impetus for
135. Representatives and direct Taxes shall be approportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number
of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and
excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons.
3.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl.
136. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
137. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1970); 28 id. § 1343(3); 42 id. § 1983 (Supp. II
1972).
138. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
139. Id. at71-72.
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the enactment of the fourteenth amendment. Again, in the SlaughterHouse Cases, Justice Miller described the purpose of the fourteenth
amendment, including the equal protection clause, as providing a basis
of challenge to the black codes:
Among the first acts of legislation adopted by several of the States
. . . were laws which imposed upon the colored races onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life,
liberty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of
little value, while they had lost the protection which they had received from -their former owners from motives both of interest and
humanity.
They were in some States forbidden to appear in the town in
any other character than menial servants. They were required to reside on and cultivate the soil without the right to purchase or own
it. They were excluded from many occupations of gain, and were
not permitted to give testimony in courts in any case where a white
man was a party. It was said that their lives were at the mercy
of bad men, either because the laws for their protection were insufficient or were not enforced.
These circumstances, whatever of falsehood or misconception
may have been mingled with their presentation, forced upon [statesmen] the conviction that something more was necessary in the way
of constitutional protection to the unfortunate race which had suffered so much. They accordingly passed through Congress the
proposition for the fourteenth amendment, and they declined to
treat as restored to their full participation in the government of the
Union the States which had been in insurrection, until140they ratified
that article by a formal vote of their legislative bodies.
Plaintiffs, butchers forced to go out of business because the state had
created a monopoly, argued for a broad, nonracial scope of the Civil
War amendments. They principally claimed that the right to be a
butcher was a privilege of citizenship within the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, and that federal courts should
protect them from state laws interfering with their right to do business. 141 Had the Court accepted their argument, the federal judiciary
would have acquired general supervisory power over state law treatment
of citizens. For example, if the main thrust of the equal protection
clause were freed from its central purpose of protecting blacks, it could
be argued that it established a rule of formal equality--"like cases be
treated alike and different cases differently"-with the federal courts
having the final say as to what was alike and what was different.
140. Id. at 70-71.
141. Id. at 51-55.
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The courts have never accepted such a revolutionary inroad on the
idea of federalism. But ever since the Slaughter-House Cases the
central tension of equal protection litigation has been the determination
of when courts would actively scrutinize state activity under the fourteenth amendment and when they would defer to decisions of the other
arms of government. Professor Bickel's argument seems convincing
that it was beyond the understanding of the framers of the fourteenth
amendment that that amendment would give blacks immediate suffrage
rights, much less access to integrated education. However, he also
argued persuasively that the original understanding was "latitudinarian"
1 42
enough to grow with the "moral and material state of the nation.
To determine what the present day "moral and material state of the
nation" is, at least as seen by the Supreme Court, will require some
further inquiry into the course of equal protection litigation. In 1879
the Supreme Court in Strauder v. West Virginia'" struck down a statute
that oh its face disqualified blacks from jury service. The Court,
however, was careful to limit its inquiry to the race question, making it
clear that the state was free to prescribe nonracial qualifications for
jurors, such as limiting them to males, freeholders, citizens or educated
persons. Even though most of those qualifications would obviously exclude a disproportionate share of blacks, the Court denied that "the
Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit this . . . . Its
aim was against discrimination because of race or color." 144 While
Strauder was limited to a racial exclusion on the face of a statute, it did
open up to blacks one of the indicia of full citizenship in our society, the
right and the obligation to serve on juries.
In 1886 the Supreme Court, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,1 " expanded
the scope of equal protection interpretation in two ways. First, it
allowed persons other than blacks and former slaves to bring equal
protection challenges against racial discrimination.'" Secondly, it used
the equal protection clause to reach beyond discrimination on the face of
a law in striking down statistically demonstrated discrimination in the
administration of a law neutral on its face."4 In Yick We, a municipal
ordinance prohibited operating a laundry without official permission
142. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HAiv. L.
REV. 1, 65 (1955).
143. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
144. ld.at3O.

145. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
146. Id. at 369.
147. Id. at 373-74.

19761

MANDATED PREFERENCES

351

unless the business occupied a brick or stone building. 48 While 150
Chinese laundry operators had been denied official permission, the
eighty non-Chinese operators were left unmolested. 149 The Supreme
Court found unconstitutional discrimination even without a racial classification on the face of the law:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with
an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the Constitution.' 50
In one sense the administration of this law was along precise racial lines:
all those who were denied permission were Chinese, while no Caucasians
were similarly treated. However, in another sense, the administration
did not strictly follow racial lines. Some fifty Chinese laundry operators
who presumably had not been denied permission joined the action. 5 '
Thus the Court found an equal protection violation even though "only"
150 of 200 Chinese were disparately treated. Perhaps it was sufficient
for a racial classification to be found that all those adversely affected
were Chinese.
Despite Strauder's striking down of a statute with a racial classification and the thrust of Yick Wo beyond such facially discriminatory
52
classifications, the Supreme Court in 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson,
cited with approval, under the "separate-but-equal' doctrine, a statute
with a racial classification on its face that did not exclude blacks
from schools, but which provided for schools segregated by race. 3
Even during the long period in which the separate-but-equal doctrine
operated to limit the bite of the fourteenth amendment, some progress
was made by attacks on the failure of the states to provide any, much
less separate, facilities for blacks. 54 In Sweatt v. Painter,'5 5 plaintiff was a black who applied to the University of Texas Law School
148. Id. at 357.
149. Id. at 359.
150. Id. at 373-74.
151. See id. at 359.
152. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
153. Id. at 544-45. This was not the primary focus of Plessy however, which
essentially dealt with de lure segregation of train passengers.
154. See Greenberg, Litigation for Social Change: Methods, Limits and Role In
Democracy, 29 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 320 (1974), where Jack Greenberg of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund discusses the use of race-discrimination litigation as one
model for the use of litigation strategy for social change.
155. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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and who was rejected solely because of his race. Since the state
provided no opportunity for blacks to get a legal education, Texas
belatedly attempted to comply with Plessy's separate-but-equal standard
by opening a law school for blacks. 1 6 Despite a much superior student-teacher ratio (5:1 versus 53:1) and a better library volume per
student ratio (717:1 versus 76:1) in the black school, the Supreme
Court found that the two schools were not substantially equal in educational opportunities:
In terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity -for specialization, size of the student body, scope of the library,
availability of law review and similar activities, the University of
Texas Law School is superior. What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree those
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which
make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name but
a few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, tradition and prestige. It is difficult to believe that one
who had a free choice between these law schools would consider
the question close.
Moreover .... [tihe law school, the proving ground for legal
learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts. .

.

. The

law school to which Texas is willing to admit petitioner excludes
from its student body members of the racial groups which number
85% of the population of the State and include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of the
Texas Bar. With such a substantial and significant segment of society excluded, we cannot conclude that the education offered petitioner is substantiaily equal to that which he would receive if admitted to the University of Texas Law School. 157
The value of interracial interchange and experience for blacks
within predominately white institutions, the institutions that have power
in themselves and provide access to other institutions of power, was the
focus of another case decided the same day, McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents. 58 Here, a black plaintiff finally was admitted to doctoral studies in education at Oklahoma State University, since the state had
failed to provide any separate graduate education programs for
blacks.1 9 Once admitted, however,
156. Id. at 632.

157. Id. at 633-34.
158. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
159. Id. at 639-40.
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he was required to sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom
adjoining the classroom; to sit at a designated desk on the mezzanine floor of the library. . and to sit at a designated table and
to eat at a different time from the other students in the school cafeteria ....
...
[These conditions] signify that the State, in administering the facilities it affords for professional and graduate study, sets
McLaurin apart -from the other students. The result is that appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate instruction.
Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage
in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession. 160

So even before Brown struck down racial segregation manifested
on the face of statutes, there was some indication that there might exist
an affirmative duty toward blacks to provide some real chance for
participation in majority-dominated social institutions. The one limitation on that duty to provide an integrated environment was the free
association right of each student. Thus, the Court recognized that the
state could not compel other students to associate with McLaurin:
It may be argued that appellant will be in no better position when
these restrictions are removed, for he may still be set apart by his
fellow students. This we think irrelevant. There is a vast difference-a Constitutional difference-between restrictions imposed
by the state which prohibit the intellectual commingling of students,
and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the state presents no bar.:""
The state, however, was precluded by the equal protection clause from
enforcing by law or rule the free association rights of whites not to
interact with blacks.'6
(2) Post Brown: The Duty To Integrate and Disproportionate Impact
Analysis
The above cases show that the "separate-but-equal"<rhetoric was
used to justify the same kind of exclusion required by the slave codes
and black codes. So the stage was set for Brown v. Board of Education.'13 But these cases also showed that at least where the state failed
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 640-41.
Id. at 641.
Id. at 642.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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entirely to provide facilities for blacks, it had the affirmative duty to
admit blacks to previously all-white institutions and that, once blacks
were admitted, the state had the obligation to provide an integrated
environment, including the full opportunity, though not compulsion, for
all students to meet and get to know one another. In Brown the Court
held that state-imposed racial segregation in the public schools violates
the equal protection clause. The Court dodged a direct challenge to
Plessy by holding that segregated public schools are, as an empirical
matter, "inherently unequal."'1 4 After discussing the "intangible" qualities involved in denying blacks access to graduate education in the
context of Sweatt and McLaurin, the Court made the judgment that:
Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade
and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.'0 5
The Court in Brown did not have to reach beyond state
mandated-de ]ure-segregation. But the cases since Brown developing remedial jurisprudence have gone far to eliminate or at least blur the
de facto/de jure distinction and to develop an affirmative duty component into equal protection analysis. The first remedy case was Brown
11,166 in which the Supreme Court remanded to the district courts with
instructions that school districts be required "to achieve a system of
determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis,"'0 7 to
"effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system,"' 68 and "to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory
'0 0
basis with all deliberate speed."'
The southern reaction to Brown 11 was the enactment of "pupil
placement" laws requiring that children be assigned initially to racially
identified schools but that they be given an opportunity to transfer to
schools formerly reserved for the other race.170 These plans were tested
164. See id. at 494-95.
165. Id. at 494.
166. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II). See the
superlative article, Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and
EmpiricalAnalysis, 60 CALIF. L. Rv. 275, 285-92 (1972).
167. 349 U.S. at 300.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 301.
170. Note, The Federal Courts and Integration of Southern Schools: Troubled
Status of the Pupil Placement Acts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (1962).
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and found wanting in Green v. County School Board.171 The case
involved a rural area with two schools, one formerly white and the other
black. After three years of a "freedom of choice" plan allowing each
pupil to choose between the schools, not a single white had chosen the
formerly black school and only fifteen percent of the black students had
chosen the formerly white school. 172 In striking down the plan as an
ineffective means to the abolition of a segregated system, the unanimous
Court recognized that, where state-compelled dual school systems had
operated, the authorities had an affirmative duty to operate integrated
systems. "School boards such as the respondent then operating statecompelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch.' 73 Because the housing in the rural school district was
integrated (the segregated schools had been maintained by busing) 74 a
residential or neighborhood school zone policy would have resulted in
much more integration than the freedom of choice plan adopted by the
school board. Thus, it was not until Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,7 1 the case that approved busing to end a
segregated school system, that the Court faced a large urban school
system where, because of segregated residential areas, a neighborhood
school assignment would not bring about integration. In Swann the
school board, after rejecting attendance policies that would increase
integration, such as pairing and clustering of nonadjacent zones, adopted a policy providing neighborhood school attendance zones. 6 Since
the neighborhood school plan would have left more than half the black
elementary students in schools overwhelmingly black, the Court, in a
unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Burger, indicated that the school
board's duty extended beyond attendance plans neutral on their face,
because:
such plans may fail to counteract the continuing effects of past
school segregation resulting from discriminatory location of school
sites or distortion of school size in order to achieve or maintain an
artificial racial separation. When school authorities present a district court with a "loaded game board," affirmative action in the
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

391 U.S. 430 (1968).
Id. at 441.
Id. at 437-38. See also Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
391 U.S. at 432.
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Id. at 8-10.
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form of remedial altering of attendance
zones is proper to achieve
71
truly nondiscriminatory assignments.
To avoid presenting such "loaded" plans to district courts, school authorities were armed with discretion to use racial classifications even to
the end of achieving racial balance:
School authorities. . might well conclude, for example, that
in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each
school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students
reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as
an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of
school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional violation,
however,
that would not be within the authority of a federal
78
court.'
In North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 7 9 the
Supreme Court protected that range of discretion by striking down a
statute that flatly prohibited assignment of students by race:
[T]he statute exploits an apparently neutral form to control school
assignment plans by directing that they be "color blind"; that requirement, against the background of segregation, would render illusory the promise of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). Just as the race of students must be considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also must
race be considered in formulating a remedy.' 80
It is ironic that a statute that would have been hailed as a great victory
for integration in 1954 was found unconstitutional as a hindrance to
integration in 1971. But it also shows the change in the conception of
what is required to comply with equal protection. From a negative
prohibition not to segregate there has evolved an affirmative obligation
to integrate, at least where de lure segregation had been found to
exist. 181 In Swann the idea of a neighborhood school assignment policy
was late in coming. It was adopted only after the previous policy of
assignment by race to separate schools had been struck down. This
raises the suspicion that the neighborhood plan had been imposed as
177. Id. at 28.

178. Id. at 16.
179. 402U.S. 43 (1971).

180. Id. at 45.
181. The existence of state-mandated school segregation was noted in congressional
debate over the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. See Bickel, supra note 142. The
"separate-but-equal" doctrine adopted to uphold segregation in Plessy apparently originated in Massachusetts. See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 206, 209 (1849),
which upheld school segregation against a claim based on a guarantee of equality in the
state constitution. See Goodman, supra note 166, at 292-98, for a description of the
broad reach of de facto segregation outside the South.
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another device to maintain segregation or at least limit the scope of
integration.
In cases since Swann the Court has had to face challenges to socalled de facto segregation where racially segregated residential patterns
combine with neighborhood school attendance policies to the end that
the races are segregated in the public schools. The first case dealing
with this "Northern" pattern of school segregation was Keyes v. School
District No. 1.182 That case brought the first break in the previous
unanimity of the Court in school segregation cases.1 83 The previous
cases dealt with racial classifications on the face of a statute, but Keyes
involved a challenge to the Denver school system, which "has never been
operated under a constitutional or statutory provision that mandated or
permitted racial segregation in public education."' 84 The district court,
however, had found that the school authorities had engaged in intentional segregation of schools in one section of the district, despite the lack of
a statutory mandate.: 85 In upholding that finding, Justice Brennan,
speaking for the Court, insisted that the de facto/de jure distinction was
being maintained because the district court had looked for a "purpose or
intent to segregate,"' 86 and found it in the conduct of the school board
which "by use of various techniques such as the manipulation of student
attendance zones, school site selection and a neighborhood school policy,
created or maintained racially or ethnically (or both racially and ethnically) segregated schools throughout the school district. . 187
It might be argued that the Court, in upholding the finding of de
jure segregation, looked only to objective evidence, such as the racial
consequences of certain school attendance and school construction decisions, to find intent or purpose to segregate. Yet there was some
evidence showing strong segregative effect that really had no facially
neutral justification. While the school attendance zones might be justified by a neighborhood school policy that was neutral on its face, no
182. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
183. Justice Douglas concurred in a separate opinion, id. at 214; Chief Justice
Burger concurred in the result, id.; Justice Powell concurred in part and dissented in part,
id. at 217; and Justice Rehnquist dissented, id. at 254.
184. Id. at 191.
185. 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo. 1969).
186. 413 U.S. at 193, 208.
187. Id. at 191. The Court also described the relevant factors in finding that a
school is segregated: "What is or is not a segregated school will necessarily depend on
the facts of each particular case. In addition to the racial and ethnic composition of a
school's student body, other factors, such as the racial and ethnic composition of faculty
and staff and the community and administration attitudes toward the school, must be
taken into consideration." Id. at 196.
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neutral justification existed for the assignment of minority teachers and
staff to minority schools.1 81 So, lacking even the cover of a neutral
justification, the school board could be seen as acting with the purpose
of maintaining school segregation.
The big issue in Keyes was the impact on a whole school system of
a finding of de jure segregation in one part of that system. The Court
reversed and remanded, indicating that the obvious implication of segregating blacks into one group of schools was to segregate whites into the
rest of the schools. Because de jure segregation had already been
found, the burden had shifted to the school authorities "to adduce proof
sufficient to support a finding that segregative intent was not among the
factors that motivated their action."' 89 A further possible defense
available to the school board was the lack of causation. Even if the
board could not disprove segregative intent, it could rebut the prima
facie case "by showing that its past segregative acts did not create or
contribute to the current segregated conditions of the core city
schools."' 9 0

As in Swann, the issue of the legitimacy of a neighborhood school
attendance policy was raised as a defense but, again as in Swann, the
Court avoided confronting the issue directly because of the finding
that school authorities manipulated attendance zones to segregate the
schools:
We have no occasion to consider in this case whether a "neighborhood school policy" of itself will justify racial or ethnic concentrations in the absence of a finding that school authorities have committed acts constituting de jure segregation. It is enough that we
hold that the mere assertion of such a policy is not dispositive
where, as in this case, the school authorities have been found to
have practiced de jure segregation in a meaningful portion of the
school system by techniques that indicate that the "neighborhood
school" concept has not been maintained free of manipulation. 191
Justice Douglas concurred, stating that "for the purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Aiendment as applied to the
school cases, no difference between de facto and de jure segregation
188. There may be a nonneutral yet constitutional justification for assigning minority teachers and staff to predominately minority schools. In Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld an employment preference for Indians in
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, at least partly under the rationale that the Bureau would be
more sensitive and responsive to Indian problems if staffed by Indians.
189. 413 U.S. at 210.
190. Id.at2ll.
191. Id.at 212.
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[exists]. 1 1 92 Justice Powell, in an extended and powerful opinion,
argued to end the de jure/de facto dichotomy. His major support for
abolishing that dichotomy was the evolution of equal protection doctrine
from Brown I to Swann. While Brown originally meant that blacks
have "the right not to be compelled by state action to attend a segregated school system," now they have a right to expect that "local school
boards will operate integrated school systems."'' In other words, the
integration of schools, which entered equal protection jurisprudence as a
remedy imposed on schools that had been de jure segregated, has
become an affirmative obligation for all state officials under the equal
protection clause. Given that affirmative duty on the part of school
authorities, Justice Powell proposed a two-step formula for determining
whether the authorities are properly performing their equal protection
duties. Challengers to the way school authorities have performed those
duties can make out a prima facie case with statistics showing segregation, which is established if "a substantial percentage of schools [is]
populated by students from one race only or predominantly so populated."'8 4 Once a prima facie case is made out the burden shiftA to the
school authorities "to demonstrate they nevertheless are operating a
genuinely integrated school system."' 9 5 While not every school in the
district need be integrated for the system to be genuinely integrated, the
school authorities, to carry their burden, must show that, for the system
as a whole, they had taken appropriate steps to:
(i) integrate faculties and administration; (ii) scrupulously assure
equality of facilities, instruction, and curriculum opportunities
throughout the district; (iii) utilize their authority to draw attendance zones to promote integration; and (iv) locate new schools,
close old ones, and determine the size and grade categories with
the same objective in mind. Where school authorities decide to
undertake the transportation of students, this also must be with integrative opportunities in mind.' 9 6
While Justice Brennan in Keyes spoke of subjective intent to
segregate, Justice Powell had moved beyond intent, beyond de jure/de
facto distinctions, to a statistical "differential impact" model of equal
protection very much like discrimination analysis developed in the em192. Id. at 214-15.

193. Id. at 225-26 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
in original).
194. Id. at 224 n.10.
195. Id. at 224.
196. Id. at 226.
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ployment area: 9 7 plaintiffs establish a prima facie case by statistics
showing that a substantial percentage of schools in the district or
districts challenged are predominantly populated by students from one
race only. Once a prima facie case is shown, the school authorities must
show that the segregation occurred despite their best efforts to promote
integration.
The important school segregation case of 1974 was Milliken v.
Bradley,' 98 which involved metropolitan Detroit school districts. The
case is best known for limiting the Swann busing remedy. Without a
finding of segregation in each school district of a metropolitan area, the
Court found it improper to order cross-district busing, even if it were
necessary to end segregation in the school districts that were found to be
segregated.' 9 9 While that aspect of the case was of the greatest immediate significance, in the long run it may be more important that a majority
of the Court seemed to have accepted the position Justice Powell took in
Keyes. Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court, upholding the district
court's findings that the center city school district had violated the equal
protection clause because the "natural, probable, forseeable and actual
effect" of various practices was to increase or maintain segregation. 00
The kinds of practices looked to by the district court, as described by the
Chief Justice, were like those described by Justice Powell in his Keyes
dissent-the manipulation of optional attendance zones in residential
areas undergoing racial transition to allow white students to escape
identifiably black schools; drawing north-south attendance zone boundaries despite awareness that east-west boundary lines would lessen segregation significantly; use of busing to maintain rather than lessen segregation; and school site and construction policies that failed to promote
integration. The Court thus found that "under our decision last term in
Keyes v. School District No. 1, . . . the findings [of segregative violations by the Detroit Board of Education] appear to be correct." 20 1 While
that affirmance may not have been an acceptance of Justice Powell's
position in Keyes that the de facto/de lure distinction should be abol197. See text accompanying notes 54-107 supra.
198. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Justice Stewart concurred while Justices Douglas,
Brennan, White and Marshall dissented. See Symposium: Milliken v. Bradley and the
Futureof UrbanSchool Desegregation,21 WAYNE L. REV. 751 (1975).

199. The Court set out the possible situations in which interdistrict busing would be
appropriate: "[Aln interdistrict remedy might be inorder where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district,
or where district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race." 418 U.S. at
745.
200. Id. at 725.
201. Id. at 738 n.18.
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ished in favor of his differential impact test, the Chief Justice does accept something very much like Justice Powell's position on the use of
statistics to establish a prima facie case:
Disparity in the racial composition of pupils within a single district
may well constitute a "signal" to a district court at the outset, leading to inquiry into the causes accounting for a pronounced racial
identifiability of schools within one school system.... However,
the use of significant racial imbalance in schools within an autonomous school district as a signal which operates simply to shift the
im'burden of proof, is a very different matter from equating racial
20 2
a
remedy.
for
calling
violation
constitutional
a
with
balance
While the Chief Justice and Justice Powell state the standard for the
establishment of a prima facie case somewhat differently, the difference
probably has little significance. For Justice Powell a prima facie case is
made out if the data shows the "existence of a substantial percentage of
schools populated by students from one race only or predominantly so
populated. 20 3 Chief Justice Burger describes the standard as a "disparity in the racial composition of pupils" or as 2a0 4 "pronounced racial
identifiability of schools within one school system.
Once a prima facie case is shown, the burden of proof and presumably of persuasion is shifted to the school authorities for rebuttal. While
Justice Powell elaborately described what a school district must do to
carry its rebuttal burden,20 5 Chief Justice Burger left it with a rather
elliptical statement that the school authorities must show that "the
causes accounting for a pronounced racial identifiability 2 06 are not
attributable to their policies.
While the Milliken majority's acceptance of Justice Powell's position in Keyes is not as clearly described in all of its ramifications as it
might be, the structure of school segregation litigation is laid out as a
two-step process. Plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case against
school officials by showing the schools to be largely racially identifiable.
The school authorities then must carry the burden of rebuttal. While
the scope of possible rebuttal is not entirely clear, what is clear is that
the mere assertion of a facially neutral justification will not by itself
202. Id. at 741 n.19.
203. 413 U.S. at224n.10.
204. 418 U.S. at 741 n.19. These descriptions comport with what Professor Goodman saw as the Court's mind in Green and Swann as the elimination of "severe racial
imbalance-the 'one-race' or 'racially identifiable' school-whatever its source." Goodman, supra note 166, at 292.
205. See text accompanying note 196 supra.
206. 418 U.S. at 741 n.19.
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suffice. Such a justification, like a neighborhood attendance policy, will
be accepted as legitimate but the inquiry will focus on how the policy
has been implemented. Since the burden is on the school board, it
presumably has to show that its policies could not have been implemented in such a way as to lessen segregation or that everything was done to
promote integration. Given the wide discretion school boards were
acknowledged to have in Swann to combat segregation, including the
discretion to use quotas to promote racial balance, the rebuttal burden
seems quite difficult, if not impossible, to meet. Whether doing less
than was possible to integrate schools has the natural and probable
effect of increasing segregation and is thus de jure segregation under
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Keyes, or whether the de lure
finding has dropped from the picture as Justice Powell would have it,
the majority in Milliken v. Bradley did accept a two-step test in segregation cases. The test shifts the burden rather easily to school authorities
to defend their policies as not contributing to segregation. The burdenshifting is crucial, especially given the scope of discretion open to school
authorities to adopt policies that promote integration.
There are several paths of justification school districts might advance in their defense. One is where the student population is nearly all
of one race, so there was no way to integrate the student population regardiless of the intradistrict policies adopted. Where that is the case the
basic thrust of the litigation would go to the other wing of Milliken to
determine whether interdistrict relationships have maintained or created
segregation. A second justification might be a plea of ignorance. The
school board in Milliken erred because it adopted various policies
that had the "natural and probable" consequence of maintaining segregation when it had available other means of implementing legitimate
policies that would have promoted integration. So school authorities
might plead ignorance of policy alternatives that would have lessened
segregation.20 7 The opportunity to raise the defense of ignorance may
be limited since, at least in large urban areas, integration of schools has
been an issue so long that numerous alternative policies and plans for
their implementation, including some that would lessen segregation,
have been considered. More fundamentally, if school boards have a
duty to promote integration, ignorance of that duty or of the consequences of the policies adopted should not be excused.
207. Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (differences in amount of
"need" paid for by welfare schemes not racial discrimination where authorities were
unaware that blacks and Spanish-surnamed persons were more concentrated in the
programs that provided a smaller share of need)..
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A third and final justification involves the relationship between the

duty to promote integration and the other obligations facing school
authorities in the performance of their duties. The problem arises when

there are some alternate ways of implementing legitimate school policies
that could have improved the prospects for integration. Does that make
it impossible for the school board to rebut the prima facie case? Or can

the school board still justify the plans it adopted by somehow showing
that the alternatives bore an unacceptably high cost, either educationally

or financially, or were in some other way unjustified? When the inquiry
reaches the level of balancing integration with financial and other

educational goals the courts will be treading on difficult ground. Yet it
is not that much different than what the federal courts have come to

handle in Southern de jure cases in which they monitor every aspect of
school administration while the dual school systems are dismantled.
Future litigation will determine the scope of justification.

But

what is already clear from Milliken and Keyes is that the Court has not
confronted the legitimacy of such school policies as neighborhood school

attendance zones, but has accepted their legitimacy and looked instead at
their implementation to see if the results have promoted integration.

If,

finally, a school board is found to have failed to promote integration, the
full range of Swann (as modified by Milliken) remedies are available,
which may require school boards to give up their neighborhood school

policies in order to eliminate segregation "root and branch. ' 20
(3) Possible Limits on Disproportionate Impact Analysis
Some limits that might be placed on the use of disproportionate
impact analysis in race cases have emerged from unsuccessful attempts
to expand beyond race the range of judicial activism under the equal
208. Two other wings of racial discrimination cases use statistics to prove racial
exclusion from a municipality and from jury service. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339, 341 (1960), the city limits of Tuskegee, Alabama were changed, thereby
excluding "from the city all save only four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not
removing a single white voter or resident." Justice Frankfurter relied on the fifteenth
amendment to strike down the gerrymandering because of its differential impact: "While
in form this is merely an act redefining metes and bounds, if the allegations are
established, the inescapable human effect of this essay in geometry and geography is to
despoil colored citizens, and only colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting
rights." Id. at 347. See Weaver and Hess, A Procedure for Nonpartisan Districting:
Development of Computer Techniques, 73 YALE L.J. 288 (1963). In Carter v. Jury
Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970), the Court relied on equal protection analysis, rather than
the sixth amendment right to a jury trial, to find a discriminatory jury selection system
where only thirty-two percent of the list was black in a sixty-five percent black county.
See Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. Rlv. 338 (1966), for a refined statistical analysis.
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protection clause. In Dandridge v. Williams,2"' plaintiffs challenged
Maryland's classification that set maximum benefits for aid to families
with dependent children because the limit disadvantaged large families.
The Supreme Court upheld the benefit limits by relying on the rational
relationship standard of review applicable to the "area of economics and
social welfare."2 1 In so holding, the Court noted that there was "no
contention that the Maryland regulation is infected with a racially
discriminatory purpose or effect such as to make it inherently suspect."2 11 Similarly, in James v. Valtierra,21 2 the Court upheld against
an equal protection challenge a California constitutional provision requiring all low-cost housing projects to be approved by local referenda. 21 3 In so doing, the Court distinguished Hunter v. Erickson,2 14
where a referendum approval requirement for any ordinance regulating
racial discrimination in real estate transactions was struck down because
no other ordinances bearing on housing had to be enacted by referendum. James v. Valtierra was different because the referendum requirement was for "any low-rent public housing project, not only for projects
which will be occupied by a racial minority. '215 Further, "the record
here would not support any claim that 2a1 6law seemingly neutral on its
face is in fact aimed at a racial minority.
With that precedent, equal protection litigators attempted to cast
their challenges in a manner that would show racial discrimination. In
Jefferson v. Hackney, 17 plaintiffs challenged a Texas welfare scheme
that provided one hundred percent of "need" to aged persons eligible for
benefits and ninety-five percent for the disabled and blind people who
were eligible, but only seVenty-five percent of "need" to families with
dependent children.2" 8 The basis of the challenge was that more blacks
and Mexican-Americans were eligible for aid to families with dependent
children than were eligible for the programs that provided a higher
percentage of need. 219 Thus, differential impact was shown and should
have been considered discriminatory. The Supreme Court, in an
209. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
210. Id. at 485.
211. Id. at 485 n.17.
212. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
213. Id. at 142-43.
214. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
215. 402 U.S. at 141.
216. Id., citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), as authority to govern
cases in which a claim of racial discrimination is made.
217. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
218. Id. at 537 n.3,545.
219. Id. at 538.
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opinion by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, upheld the classification scheme by
relying on Dandridge v. Williams. Because the Court found it unchallenged that the Texas officials "did not know the racial make-up of the
various welfare assistance categories prior to or at the time when the
orders here under attack were issued,' 22 0 it held that the mere showing
that blacks and other minorities made up a greater percentage of
persons eligible for family benefits which are calculated to provide less
of their need was not unconstitutional:
Appellants are thus left with their naked statistical argument: that
there is a larger percentage of Negroes and Mexican-Americans in
AFDC than in the other programs, and that the AFDC is funded
at 75% whereas the other programs are funded at 95% and 100%
of recognized need. . . . The basic outlines of eligibility for the
various categorical grants are established by Congress, not by the
States; given the heterogeneity of the Nation's population it would
be only an infrequent coincidence that the racial composition of
each grant class was identical to that of the others. The acceptance of appellants' constitutional theory would render suspect each
difference in treatment among the grant classes, however lacking
in racial motivation and however otherwise rational the treatment
221
might be.
Hackney is a difficult case to deal with. It can be avoided by considering that it preceded Keyes and Milliken and the recent desegregation
cases, and so has been eclipsed by the newly-emerged analysis of those
cases. Or it can be distinguished whenever the government officials
have knowledge of the racial impact of the challenged policy. The case
might also be distinguished in situations in which a challenged classification is more clearly drawn on racial lines. In Hackney the link
between the challenged welfare programs was "need." In the context of
these very different programs, that common thread of need might be
viewed as an artifact or word-of-art that draws together schemes so
dissimilar as to be incomparable. In other words, the government could
have enacted and administered each of these welfare schemes as entirely
separate programs. Without the unifying "need" criterion it would be
very hard to find any way of attacking the entire welfare scheme as
discriminatory just because minority group members were more concentrated in one program than another. Unless there were some method to
compare treatment under the various programs, there would be no way
to show that minority group members were disproportionately affected
in an adverse way.
220. Id. at 547.

221. Id. at 548 (footnote omitted).
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While Hackney may be distinguished, more fundamentally it must
be questioned. While Justice Rehnquist glibly treats it as a Dandridge
case generally challenging the rationality of a welfare scheme, the
central thrust of the case is that racial discrimination was involved in a
state scheme that just happened to involve welfare benefits. Hopefully,
even Justice Rehnquist would accept a challenge to a welfare scheme
that excluded all blacks, or even most blacks, from receiving benefits
they would receive if they were white. Even if this exclusion of blacks
were accomplished by some device that was racially neutral on its face, it
is inconceivable that a majority of the Court would uphold the device
without some greater scrutiny than was apparent in Hackney. The
question is why the Court upheld a policy that gave benefits at a reduced
percentage of need to a group that had higher percentage of minority
group members.
There seem to be several possible ways to fit Hackney into the
mainstream. In a strange way the case might have presaged Morton v.
Mancari222 as a benevolent, rather than invidious, racial classification. If
all welfare programs are viewed from afar as compensatory schemes to
offset economic hardships caused by different life situations, including
racial discrimination, then all these programs, including those viewed as
compensating for racial discrimination, would be reviewed under the
rational relationship standard used to uphold the employment preference for Indians in Mancari. Thus, where a program has no impact one
way or the other on integration of minorities into full citizenship
roles,223 but is designed to buffer the impact of hardship, the courts
would not take an activist posture in review. Yet such an approach has
the danger of too easily accepting a compensatory rationale that would
let real injustice slip through without careful scrutiny.
Hackney may have been somewhat clarified by San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,224 in which the Court turned back
the drive to have education treated as a "fundamental right" and wealth
a "suspect classification" for "new" equal protection purposes. The case
involved a challenge to the Texas local school financing system that
results in different per pupil expenditures among school districts because
of differences in their tax bases. Thus the claim was that the poor
received less education because they lived in school districts with low tax
222. 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (employment preference for Indians upheld). See notes
43-53 and accompanying text supra.
223. See discussion in notes 227-38 infra, that the central purpose of the equal
protection clause is the promotion of integration of minorities into full citizenship roles.
224. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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bases. The Supreme Court reversed a district court finding that, in the
context of educational financing, wealth was a suspect classification.
The Court dodged the wealth classification issue by finding that, in the
case as presented, poor school districts were not coextensive with the
residential areas of poor families. There was no clearly defined group
of poor persons against whom the school financing system discriminated. 2 5 The Court's tone of restraint in Rodriguez, as in Dandridge and
James v. Valtierra, indicates that, if forced to face the question, the
Court would hold that wealth is not a suspect classification. Take for
example a challenge to the constitutionality of a sales tax. After Rodriguez it is unlikely that a showing that the tax is regressive, that is, that
poor people pay a greater share of their purchasing power in sales tax
than do the more affluent, would be found sufficient to strike down the
tax on equal protection grounds. Under Hackney a showing that blacks
and other minorities constituted a disproportionately large share of the
poor would not seem sufficient to knock down the sales tax. A racial
discrimination challenge to a sales tax might only be successful if some
kind of showing could be made that, over and above the regressive
impact the tax has on all the poor, there was some added adverse impact
on blacks not shared by whites similarly situated economically. Such an
approach isolates the variables of race and wealth and accepts the
disproportionate impact on minorities that is attributable solely to economics. That isolation of race and wealth may be quite dangerous,
however, because much of the economic plight suffered by minorities
results from racial discrimination. In other words, there is a causal
connection running from minority group status to economic deprivation.
Perhaps the way to avoid eviscerating racial discrimination analysis
would be to require a state using a Rodriguez and Hackney rationale to
shoulder the burden of proving that racial discrimination was not causally related to the economic deprivation at issue. To do that, however,
of the very casual
would require initially, at a minimum, the stiffening
226
scrutiny engaged in by the Court in Hackney.
225. Id. at 28.
226. In Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975) the court relied on
Hackney and James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), to refuse to apply strict scrutiny
to an equal protection challenge to the Georgia bar exam:
The gravamen of [plaintiffs'] argument is that the disproportionate passing
rates of black and white applicants on the examination serve to create the classification based on race which is needed to trigger strict judicial scrutiny. The
difficulty with this position, however, is that it stands in the face of a clear
body of law holding that an otherwise legitimate classification does not become
constitutionally "suspect" simply because greater numbers of a racial minority
fall in the group disadvantaged by the classification.
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THE CONTEMPORARY EQUAL PROTECTION PURPOSE:

PROMOTING THE RACIAL INTEGRATION OF MINORITY GROUP
MEMBERS INTO FULL CITIZENSHIP ROLES

This section will pull together the various developments discussed
so far that show the purpose of equal protection today to be the
promotion of racial integration. Some of these developments, including
DeFunis and Morton v. Mancari,2 7 uphold preference programs designed to promote racial integration of law schools and public employment. Even the pre-Brown cases, which ordered states to admit blacks
to higher education because no separate and equal facilites had been
provided them, required the facilities to be fully integrated.

That the

central purpose of equal protection is to promote racial integration has
been made clear in the post-Brown cases. Cases such as Jefferson v.
Hackney228 might even provide a basis for arguing that welfare pro-

grams that buffer the impact of racial discrimination without doing anything to promote the integration of minority group members into the full
range of citizenship roles are outside the scope of contemporary equal
protection.
The point can be made even more clearly by a slight change of

perspective. Suppose that the federal government uses the Indian employment preference upheld in Mancari in such a way that all or

substantially all Bureau of Indian Affairs employees are Indians. Or, a
case closer to our topic, a state runs a law school for blacks only,
excluding all white applicants. Can majority group members successfully challenge these segregated institutions?
The answer ought to be "yes," but to arrive at it requires a look at
several cases in which whites have successfully raised claims challenging
exclusionary state action. In Loving v. Virginia,220 a black and a white
were convicted of miscegenation; each of them claimed the statute
violated equal protection. The state argued that there was no equal
517 F.2d at 1099. The court characterized plaintiffs' distinction that Hackney and
James are applicable only to economic and social welfare areas of legislative action as
being of no significance "since Georgia bar examinees are not judged on the basis of
broad generalizations, but rather on the basis of individualized determinations of whether
each applicant possesses the minimal competence required to practice law." Id. at 1100.
Alternately, the court held that if the statistical showing of disparate racial impact did
establish a prima facie case of discrimination the burden would shift to the defendant to
demonstrate that "invidious discrimination was not among the reasons for his actions."
Id. Such a showing would not be sufficient under Title VII, see text accompanying notes
89-107 supra, nor under the recent school segregation decisions, see text accompanying
notes 207-08 supra.

227. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
228. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).

229. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

See notes 43-53 and accompanying text supra.
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protection claim because the law applied equally to blacks and whites:
"Ijhe meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, as illuminated by the
statements of the Framers, is only that state penal laws containing an
interracial element as part of the definition of the offense must apply
equally to whites and Negroes in the sense that members of each race
are punished to the same degree."2 3 The Supreme Court rejected the
notion that "the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing racial
classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial discriminations."2 31 What made the classification invidious was that the antimiscegenation statute was a measure "which restrict[s] the rights of citizens
on account of race. There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom
to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. ' 2 2 The finding of invidiousness on the ground that the statute restricted the rights of both blacks
and whites to integrate their lives in marriage follows much rhetoric
about "strict scrutiny" and "compelling state interests.1 233 Yet it is this
finding, rather than the intervening rhetoric, that forms the core of
the entire decision.
The case that most clearly shows that the promotion of racial
integration is the prime contemporary purpose of equal protection is
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority.23 4 Plaintiffs were minority
group members who applied for admission to a low rent public housing
project, but who were turned down because the housing authority feared
that admitting too many minority groups applicants would cause the
project and its surrounding area to "tip" into a minority ghetto. That
is, when the minority residents reached a certain numerical level in the
neighborhood, all or most white residents would exercise their greater
residential mobility and move out, leaving a minority ghetto. 2 5 The
district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding
that, while the housing authority had a duty to foster integration, it
could not exercise that duty where to do so would deprive minority
persons of low-cost housing.23 6 The Second Circuit reversed:
We disagree as to the district court's interpretation of the Authority's duty to integrate. We do not view that duty as a "one-way
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 11.
484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1130.
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street" limited to introduction of non-white persons into a
inantly white community. The Authority is obligated to
firmative steps to promote racial integration even though
in some instances not operate to the immediate advantage
237
non-white persons.

[VCol. 54
predomtake afthis may
of some

The remand order reflects the court's uncertainty in allowing quotas that
would exclude minority group members because their exclusion is necessary to the furtherance of integration. On remand the defendant hous-

ing authority must carry the "heavy burden" of proving that "tipping"
will occur unless plaintiff minority group members are denied access to
238
the project.
In light of Otero and the other recent cases highlighting the duty to

integrate, the employment preference for Indians in the Bureau of
Indian Affairs upheld in Morton v. Mancari and the preferential admis-

sion program upheld in DeFunis are almost old hat. The answer to the
questions raised by the hypotheticals set out at the beginning of this
section-the all-Indian Bureau of Indian Affairs and the all-black state

law school-are clear. Both the non-Indian challenging the operation
of the employment preference and the white applicant claiming admis-

sion to the law school ought to be successful.
The emergence of the duty to integrate requires the exercise of
discretion by authorities acting for the state as well as reviewing courts.
Inevitably some judgment must be made as to what is promoting
integration and what is promoting separatism. In residential patterns
like Otero the crucial question probably is the "tipping" point, that is,
the percentage of minority population that induces the majority residents
in an area to exercise their greater residential mobility by moving away,
thus leaving a ghetto. In situations like DeFunis, the problem is most
237. Id. at 1125.
238. Another way of approaching the purpose of equal protection is to show that
majority group members have equal protection claims. In Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493
(1972), a white defendant in a criminal case challenged the exclusion of blacks from the
jury that tried him. The Court ruled that the right guaranteed by the sixth amendment is
to a jury representative of the entire community, including black citizens, whether or not
the defendant is black. Id. at 504. Though Peters is a right-to-fair-jury case rather than
an equal protection case, the exclusion of blacks from jury service is an equal protection
violation. E.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970). While the exclusion of
blacks from a jury limits the range of their citizenship, it also affects whites by depriving
them of the possibility of interchange with representatives of the entire community,
including blacks, in the context of their exercise of citizenship roles as jurors. That
whites have claims challenging the exclusion of blacks was established in Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). In that case the Supreme Court
accepted white plaintiffs as "private attorneys general" to enforce the fair housing
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The essence of the plaintiffs' claim was that
they were deprived of the opportunity to be neighbors with blacks because blacks had
been denied access to housing by the conduct of the defendant landlords.
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likely as the University of Washington Law School saw it: to find as
many qualified minority persons as is necessary for the law school to
have a reasonable representation of groups that historically have been
underrepresented in the legal profession. The word "quota" carries with
it a heavy charge of emotion. Like "busing," it may be a code word for
racial prejudice. So the question of how much minority representation
is promoting integration may slip into hot debate over "quotas." Yet if
state policymakers have before them data showing the effect their policy
decisions will have on integration, the fourteenth amendment justifies
the use of that knowledge to maximize integration.
IV.

DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT ANALYSIS APPLIED TO
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS

So far the discussion has developed the notion that the contemporary purpose of equal protection is the promotion of racial integration,
even if the means used to achieve that purpose might in certain situations act to the immediate disadvantage of particular members of minority groups. Persons challenging the performance of government policies promoting integration can establish a prima facie case that the
authorities have failed in their duty by showing that the policies as they
operate have a disproportionate impact on minorities. When a prima
facie case has been made out, the defendant authorities must show that
their policies are justified despite the disproportionate impact.
Applying disproportionate impact analysis to law school admissions starts with the fact that blacks, who make up over eleven percent
of the general population, make up only 1.2 percent of lawyers and 4.1
percent of currently enrolled law students. In contrast, women, who
make up over half of the total population, constituted less than three
percent of the bar in 1970 but now make up about twenty percent of
currently enrolled law students.
1974
1970
Lawyers Law Students
Population
110,713
325,000
203,212,000
Total
105,768
321,150
177,749,000
White
4,945
3,850
22,580,000
Black
4.1%
1.2%
11.2%
% Black
21,788
9,100
104,300,000
Female
88,925
315,900
98,912,000
Male
19.7% 39
2.8%
51.4%
% Female
239. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, Pt. 1, § 2, at 1-627
(1973) (black lawyers); AMERIcAN BAR FOUND., 1971 LAwYERs STATISTICAL REPORT,
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It is indisputable that blacks are underrepresented in law schools and in
the bar. And it is also clear that blacks are gaining representation in
the legal profession at a much slower pace than the other most significantly underrepresented group-women.
These facts by themselves, of course, do not carry the day. The
first objection to according legal significance to such facts would be
based on Mayor of Philadelphiav. EducationalEquality League.240 The
case involved a challenge to a mayoral appointment to a panel that
nominated candidates to the school board. The system gave the mayor
double appointing power: first he appointed the thirteen-member nominating panel and then he chose the school board from names put
forward by that panel. According to the city charter, nine of the slots
on the nominating panel were to be filled by the highest ranking officers
of certain classifications of citywide organizations. The other four slots
were to be filled from the citizenry-at-large. Plaintiffs claimed that the
mayor had violated the equal protection clause since only two of thirteen, or fifteen percent, of the nominating panel were black, while
thirty-four percent of the city population and sixty percent of the school
population were black. 24 ' Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
generally upheld the use of statistics in race cases, but the judgment for
plaintiffs was reversed. The finding that plaintiffs had established an
unrebutted prima facie case could not stand because the court below had
relied on faulty statistical methodology:
Statistical analyses have served and will continue to serve an important role as one indirect indicator of racial discrimination in access to service on governmental bodies, particularly where, as in
the case of jury service, the duty to serve falls equally on all citizens. But the simplistic percentage comparisons undertaken by the
Court of Appeals lack real meaning in the context of this case. Respondents do not challenge the qualifications for service on the
panel set out in the charter, whereby nine of the 13 seats are restricted to the highest ranking officers of designated categories of
citywide organizations and institutions. Accordingly, this is not a
case in which it can be assumed that all citizens are fungible for
purposes of determining whether members of a particular class
1, at 5 (1972) (women lawyers); White, Is That Burgeoning Law School
Enrollment Ending?, 61 A.B.A.J. 202 (1975); ABA LAw SCHOOL AND BAu ADMISSION
REQUMEMENTS (1975) (present law school population). Total minority group enrollment is 8,333 or 7.5 percent of total law school population. Id. The increased black
and minority enrollment reflects the success of preferential admissions programs recently established. Those same programs do not extend to women, so the recent increase
in number of women law students is attributable to other factors.
240. 415 U.S. 605 (1974).
241. Id. at 610.
TAnL
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have been unlawfully excluded. At least with regard to nine seats
on the panel . . . the relevant universe for comparison purposes
consists of the highest ranking officers of the categories of organizations and institutions specified in the city charter, not the population at large. The Court of Appeals overlooked this distinction.
Furthermore, the District Court's concern for the smallness of
the sample presented by the 13-member Panel was also well foundthe imported. The Court of Appeals erred in failing to recognize
242
ance of this flaw in straight percentage comparisons.
Essentially, Justice Powell found that the city population figures
were appropriate as a base of comparison, but only for the four citizenat-large slots, and that the proper comparison had not been developed.2 4 1 In the long run, mathematical probability would anticipate
about one-third of the candidates to be black, but, with only four slots
open, panel membership may end up with any racial mixture and not be
improbable. Thus, if the names of the entire population of the city
were put in a barrel, it would be expected that, if enough names were
pulled, one-third would be black. If, however, only four names were
drawn, the sample would be too small to form the basis of any expectation of what the racial makeup of those selected would be. As to the
other nine nominating slots, the general population figures would be
useful only as a comparison to show that blacks were excluded from
leadership positions in the various types of civic organizations listed in
the charter. If the data had shown the disproportionate impact on
blacks of the civic organization leadership criteria, that would have
given plaintiffs their prima facie case and would have shifted the burden
to the city to justify the use of those criteria. If no disproportionate
exclusion of blacks from the leadership of these organizations was
shown, then that data could be appropriately compared with the appointments to the school board to see if disproportionately few black
leaders were selected. 4 4 Plaintiffs lost their case because they failed to
develop the data correctly.
Because law students and lawyers could not be expected to have
the same characteristics or qualifications as the general population, the
gross disparity between the black population and black lawyers would
by itself not be sufficient to establish a prima facie case, even though
there is some precedent for that in Title VII. 245 But more data for the
242. Id. at 620-21 (citations omitted).
243. Id.
244. The Court did not reach the issue of scope of discretion of an elected official to
appoint other officers. Id. at 616.
245. See McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 n.19 (1973). See
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challenge can be found in the elements of the basic admissions formula
used by law schools, since each such element can be shown to have a
disproportionate impact. Law schools today quite generally require
applicants to have college degrees.

These college graduate applicants

are then compared for admission through the computation of a predicted first year average composed of some formula combining college
grade point average with Law School Admission Test score. Each of
these elements screen out blacks from consideration for law school
admission at a higher rate than whites, and thus are subject to attack
because of their disproportionate impact.
The first more or less universal requirement is that, as a condition
of consideration, applicants must have a basic college degree. 24 While
about twelve percent of all people over age twenty-five have college
degrees, this figure can be broken down racially to slightly more than
five percent of blacks and 12.6 percent of whites.247 Thus, if a number
of samples of 1000 people were drawn from the general population,

somewhere around 112 members of each would be expected to be black.
But of those 112 blacks, only six would be expected to be college

graduates. If as many blacks as whites had college degrees, about
fourteen members in each sample would be expected to be black.
The law school response to the argument that the college degree

requirement has a disproportionate impact on blacks would be that the
pool of college graduates is the proper universe of comparison. With
only five percent of each college graduate pool being black, a comparinotes 77-83 and accompanying text supra. In Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86
(1973), the Court allowed defendant to rebut plaintiff's prima facie case with specific
statistics showing that there was no disproportionate impact at its plant. While this
article limits its inquiry to the use of national statistics for simplicity, the range of
statistics at regional and state levels shows a rather consistent exclusion of women, with
the range being from one percent (North Carolina) to five percent (District of
Columbia). See AMERICAN BAR FOUND., 1971 LAWYERS STATISTICAL REPORT, 1971
The distribution of black
WOMEN LAwYERs SUPPLEMENT, TABLE 12, at 26-39 (1973).
lawyers is rather consistently low. For example, in Washington the black population
comprises only 2.1 percent of the total but less than one half of one percent of the bar.
See Morris, supra note 1, at 38. In South Carolina, for example, over thirty percent of
the population is black, yet, as of 1970, less than one half of one percent of the bar was
black. See Edwards, A New Role for the Black Law Graduate-A Reality or an
Illusion, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1407, 1409 (1971), for figures for all southern states.
Presumably the proper statistical base for comparison is the general area where each law
school draws its students and places its graduates. See Note, Title VII and Employment
Discriminationin "Upper Level" Jobs, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1614 (1973).
246. For a history of educational prerequisites in legal education, see Stolz, Training
for the Public Profession of the Law (1921): A Contemporary Review, in AssocIATIoN
OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 1 PROCEEDINGS § II, at 142 (1971).
247. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1973 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, TABLE 175, at 115.
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son with the 4.1 percent black law school enrollment would not be a
showing of disproportionate impact. Plaintiffs would argue that a
college degree prerequisite has not been validated as related to success in
law school or as a lawyer and would cite Title VII authority for
challenges to educational credentials for jobs. 24 8 While Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. did strike down a high school diploma requirement for lowskill jobs in a power station,24 9 another Title VII case, Spurlock v.
United Airlines, Inc.,250 sustained a college degree requirement for
flight officers of an airline. Plaintiff, a black with two years of college
and 204 hours of flight time, challenged United's minimum requirements for a flight officer of 500 hours of flight time and a college
degree. He successfully established a prima facie case by showing that,
of the approximately 5900 flight officers in the employ of United, only
nine were black.2 5 ' United was held to have rebutted plaintiff's case
with statistics that claimed to show a direct correlation between numbers
of flight hours and success in the flight officers training program.25 2 The
college degree requirement was upheld by simple reliance on the testimony of company officials.
The evidence showed that United flight officers go through a rigorous training course upon being hired and then are required to attend intensive refresher courses at six-month intervals to insure that
all flight officers remain at peak performance ability. United officials testified that the possession of a college degree indicated that
the applicant had the ability to understand and retain concepts and
information, given in the atmosphere of a classroom or training program. Thus, a person with a college degree, particularly one in
the "hard" sciences, is more able to cope with the initial training
program and the unending series of refresher courses than a person
without a college degree. We think United met the burden of
showing that its requirement of a college degree was sufficiently
253
job-related to make it a lawful pre-employment standard.
248. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also Note, 73
COLuM. L. Rv., supra note 199, at 1614.
249. See text accompanying notes 56-76 supra.
250. 475 F.2d 216 (10thCir. 1972).
251. Id.at218.
252. The cut-off line of 500 hours seems not to be established as correct by the
statistics. They correlate as follows:
Failure Rate
No. of Hours
9%
200 or less
14%
201 to 500
8%
501 to 1000
5%
1001 to 1500
1501 to 5000
2%
Id. at 219.
253. Id.
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These nonempirically based defenses were accepted in Spurlock,
despite substantial contrary authority, 25 4 because the court applied a
lesser burden of business justification when the job involves high risk to
the safety of others:
When a job requires a small amount of skill and training and the
consequences of hiring an unqualified applicant are insignificant,
the courts should examine closely any pre-employment standard or
criteria which discriminate against minorities. In such a case, the
employer should have a heavy burden to demonstrate to the court's
satisfaction that his employment criteria are job-related. On the
other hand, when the job clearly requires a high degree of skill and
the economic and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are great, the employer bears a correspondingly lighter
burden to show that his employment criteria are job-related. Cf.
29 C.F.R. 1607.5(c) (2) (ill). The job of airline flight officer is
clearly such a job. United's flight officers pilot aircraft worth as
much as $20 million and transport as many as 300 passengers per
flight. The risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are
staggering. The public interest clearly lies in having the most
highly qualified persons available to pilot airlines. The courts,
therefore, should proceed with great caution before requiring an
employer to lower his pre-employment standards for such a job.2 0r
Admittedly, a job as flight officer involves high risk to the safety of
others; thus, Spurlock may have been rightly decided.2"" But a broad
reading of Spurlock outside situations involving a high risk of physical
danger to many people would be inappropriate, since it would hinder
equal opportunity for entry into white collar and other high status

jobs.

257

While legal education does not involve high physical risk to the
lives of many people in the way an airline pilot's job does, it is a
stepping stone to a profession which is an important and powerful force
in this society. Presumably the law school world would defend its use
of the college degree requirement by arguing that law students need to
be able to cope with the rigors of law school classes and that, even
without any empirical verification, the attainment of a college degree is a
254. See text accompanying notes 84-88, 102 supra. But see Edwards & Zaretsky,
PreferentialRemedies for Employment Discrimination,- MicH. L. REv. - (1975),
where, in a discussion of Title VII remedies, the authors describe reasons why judges
*might be more restrained in granting preferential remedies to white collar discrimination.
255. 475 F.2d at 219. Despite the emphasis on safety in the Court's opinion,
United's evidence bore only on success in the training program and was not relevant to
safe performance for flight officers flying planes with passengers.
256. However, it could be argued that Spurlock sought a chance to train for a flight
officer job and that no risk to the public was involved if he proved himself incapable of
performing in the training program.
257. See Edwards & Zaretsky, supranote 254, at-.
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good predictor that the applicant can succeed in law school classes.
However, there exist data, unexplored in Spurlock, that indicate there is
no necessary correlation between achievement in school and the performance of posteducation roles, even though those roles have educational prerequisites as conditions of entry. Professor Berg has traced
the post World War II trend of ever-increasing educational credential
requirements for jobs and found it to be based on an unproved assumption that the more the education the better the job performance. 258 After
reviewing the available data he concluded that the assumption that more
education is better is a myth. "The purposeless credential consciousness
creates unnecessary barriers to upward mobility as well as increasing the
job dissatisfaction of those better credentialed individuals who end up
with the jobs."2 59 Professor Berg recently restated his conclusions:
It is simply not creditable, in our judgment, to consider the very
large increases in the numbers of college graduates in many occupations in the period 1955-1970 to be the result of wholly rational
employer decision-making. Rather, we see these changes as adaptations of demand to available supply, adaptations informed by beliefs rather than 'by relevant facts. . . .Once again, we must be
mindful of the facts that questions of distributive justice are involved, and that it is at best glib, and, at worst, irresponsible, to
ignore the social implications of practices that favor some group at
the expense of others. The fact is that "underutilization" of college
graduates not only contributes to occupational malaise among colwhose expectations are frustrated; it displaces nonlege graduates
260
graduates.
Under Title VII discrimination analysis it is still not clear if empirical
evidence is the only kind that will rebut a prima facie case based on
empirical data. 26 1 Yet, if a challenger can bring forth data like that
collected and analyzed by Professor Berg to bolster the showing of
258. Looking at the development of "human capital" economics and the ever-rising
credential requirements for jobs, Professor Berg stated the general social assumptions
made about the value of education as a correlate to success in life settings outside
academia:
Analyses which examine the benefits of education tend to consider only income
and related returns and to define cost in narrow terms. Employers have been
inclined to accept a parallel logic without much question in the administration
of wages and salaries, believing in general that the better-educated employees
will be better for their organizations. According to managers in private enterprise, educational achievements have been taken as evidence of self-discipline
and potential for promotion. Moreover, trainability is presumed to correlate
with educational achievement as are productivity, personality-important in
many jobs-and adaptability.
I. BERG, EDUCATION AND JoBs: THE GREAT TRAINING ROBBgRY 12 (1971).
259. Id. at 194.
260. Berg, University and Marketplace, 3 COLUM. U. REc. 4, 5 (1975).
261. See text accompanying notes 89-102 supra.
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disparate impact, courts ought to require the defense to respond in kind.
In at least one case, a court ordered an empirical2 2study made once it was
clear that a prima facie case had been made out.
Even if the college degree requirement is .upheld, there still is a
substantial disparity between the college graduate pool and the law
school enrollment of blacks. While presently 7.4 percent of all college
students are black,2 63 only 4.1 percent of the present law school enrollment is black.
Beyond the college degree requirement there is data suggesting the
individual items that make up the admissions formula also have a
disproportionate impact. The average grade point for white students is
substantially higher than for blacks:
Whites
Black
GPA
50%
21%
B plus and above
32%
44%
B
C or C plus

34%

16%264

Thus, the percentage of white college students having GPA's of B plus
or above is nearly two and one-half times as high as that of blacks and
the percentage of white students having GPA's in the C range is less
than half that of blacks. That is a significant differential which, of
course, reduces the admissions prospect for blacks as a class.
As in Spurlock, where the court accepted simple testimony that
college degrees are important to pilot training, a tendency may exist to
assume that college grades predict graduate school grades and subsequent job performance. However, data are available that undermine
both those assumptions. In a study of the use of undergraduate grades
as predictors of grades in the first year of graduate study, the data
revealed a very low correlation between college grades and graduate
study performance. "Studies relating undergraduate grades to first-year
grades in graduate and professional schools over the past 20 years and
in all kinds of programs have shown correlation coefficients that fluc262. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 458
F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
263. The figures have fluctuated substantially for blacks recently: "The percentage
hovered between 2 to 3 percent in the early sixties. Blacks made up 5.7 percent of total
enrollment in 1968. The figure rose to 6.3 percent in 1971, and peaked the following
year at 8.7 percent. But in 1973, black enrollment dropped to 7.8 percent, and to 7.4
percent at the beginning of this school year." N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
264. Baird, Portrait of Blacks in Graduate and Professional Schools, in ETS, FiNDn~cs, no. 2, at 1-4 (1964).
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tuate around the value 0.30.' '26 Further, there is no demonstrable
connection between college grades and adult achievement beyond acade-

mia, including achievement in law. "Although this area of research is
plagued by many theoretical, experimental, measurement, and statistical

difficulties, present evidence strongly suggests that college grades bear
little or no relationship to any measures of adult accomplishment." 266 In
medicine, an extensive study has been made of the performance of 500
physicians based on eighty different measures of good medical practice.
As in the more general studies, no correlation was found between

undergraduate or medical school grades and performance as a physician:
[A]cademic achievement does not bear a positive relationship to
performance as a practicing researcher, academician, or physician.
On the contrary, in each of our five studies both premedical and
medical school achievement was found to be essentially independent of the numerous measures of professional contributions,
accomplishments, and activities, that we analyzed. . . . [A]cross
all groups studied . . . academic grades showed a zero267(chance)
relationship to our measures of physician performance.

In light of the adverse impact on minorities and the data. undermining
the assumption that college grades are predictors of future performance,
legal education ought to be required to come forth with concrete evidence supporting the use of college grades. Even the most recent
addition to the law school admissions formula, a variable to quantify
differences in quality of the applicant's undergraduate college, can be
challenged.

In the study of physician performance no correlation was

and the prestige of undergraduate
established between that performance
268
college or medical school attended.
The final element of the typical law school admission formula, the
265. J. WARREN, COLLEGE GRAING PRACticES: AN OvERVIEw 5 (ERIC Clearing )"
house on Higher Ed. Rep. No. 9, 1971). For the best description of statistical correla-,
tion in a legal context see Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability
Tests in Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691 (1968). For an even[
simpler explanation of the concept see Appendix C: A Layman's Guide to Statistical
Terms, in C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFEcr o FAMILY AND
SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 351 (Harper Colophon ed. 1973).
266. D. HOYT, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COLLEGE

GRADES

AND

ADULT

ACHIEVEMENT (American College Testing Program Research Rep. No. 7, 1965).
267. P. PRICE, C. TAYLOR,J.RICHARDS & T. JACOBSEN, PERFORMANCE MEASURES OF
PHYSICIANS 111 (1963). The same conclusion has been found for scientific researcher
positions. The average college grade for the top third in research was 2.73 and for the
bottom, 2.69, both in the B minus range. See Taylor, Smith & Ghiselin, The Creative
and Other Contributions of One Sample of Research Scientists, in SCIENTIFIC CREArsvry: ITS RECOGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT (C. Taylor & F. Farron ed. 1963).
268. Id.
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LSAT score, also has a disproportionate impact on blacks. Evans and
Reilly tried to determine whether the time limits involved in giving the
LSAT have a discriminatory effect on blacks. To reach that issue they
had to generate data on the mean or average LSAT scores of the special
black sample (given free at predominately black colleges in the South)
and a random sample of students tested at the regular test sites. The
black students had a mean score that was thirty-five percent lower than
the mean score achieved by the regular sample. 2 9 Other data to the
same effect are rumored to be known to the Educational Testing Service
but are unpublished. Brill indicated that he has seen unpublished data
that showed a gap of 133 points between the median scores of black and
white males on the LSAT. 27 0 There appears to be no doubt that the use
of the LSAT has a disproportionate impact on blacks and other minorities.
This issue of testing and test validation in education and, even
more so, in employment has been the subject of much study. 271 The
EEOC has issued guidelines for testing that refer to the prevailing
standards for test validation as established by the American Psychological Association.2 72 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 273 the Supreme Court
indicated that great deference ought to be given to the guidelines as an
expression of the will of Congress.27 4 Most recently, in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody" 5 the Court struck down an employer's attempt
to validate tests used to screen employees out of low level jobs in a paper
mill. 276 The best method of test validation is by "predictive" methods.
The classic validation study in the employment context would begin with
the testmaker making a careful job analysis to discover the skills and
269. Evans & Reilly, A Study of Speediness as a Source of Test Bias, 9 J. ED. MEAS.
123 (1972).
270. Brill, The Secrecy Behind the College Boards, 40 NEw YoRK 67-70 (1974).
271. See generally Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment
Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteriaof Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 1598 (1969); Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company:
Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination,and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA.
L. REv. 844 (1972); Note, Employment Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke
Power Company, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 900 (1972); Note, 68 COLUM. L. REv., supra note
265; Note, Application of the EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test Validation: A
Uniform Standard for Both Public and Private Employers, 41 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 505
(1972).
272. EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607,
1607.5(a) (1974). The APA has recently revised its standards now promulgated in
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, supranote 116.
273. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
274. Id.at 434.
275. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
276. Id. at 436.
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traits necessary for performance on the job. Once the job analysis is
complete the testmaker develops test items thought to measure as many
of the skills and traits as are necessary to the job. The next step is to
administer the test to a representative sample of job applicants and then,

as is crucial for predictive validation, hire all the applicants.

The

following step is to have the testmaker measure the job performance of
all the members of the sample group. Finally, the test scores are
compared to the job performance scores with the relationship, the so-

called correlation coefficient, expressed statistically with -. 00 (perfect
negative correlation) through 0.00 (pure chance relationship) to + 1.00

(perfect positive correlation). If the testmaker judges the test to be a
valid and useful measure of job performance, the employer can then use
the test to decide which job applicants ought to be hired.

According to this preferred method of validation, the LSAT fails
for two basic reasons. First, the LSAT is not designed to predict
performance as a lawyer.2 77 Rather, it is designed to predict performance in the first year of law school. Second, the validation techniques
used for the LSAT are not the preferred predictive techniques.

Educa-

tional Testing Service (ETS) constructs LSAT test items not on the
basis of an analysis of the "job" of being a first year law student, but on
what its professional testmakers, who are not lawyers, think would be
pertinent to performance in the first year of law study. This so-called
"rational" technique of test item selection is not favored. Once the test
is given and scored, ETS, on a school by school basis, attempts to
validate the test by comparing LSAT scores with the law school grades

of those test takers who have been admitted to the particular law school.
277. The "radical" challenge to the use of tests would reject the LSAT precisely
because it fails to test for the long term "life outcome." See McClelland, Testing for
Competence Rather than for "Intelligence," 28 AM. PsYcH. 1 (1973). The National
Teacher Examination (NTE), another test published by Educational Testing Service (the
publisher of the LSAT), has been struck down when school boards used NTE scores to
try to predict teaching performance of experienced teachers when the test was designed
only for persons without teaching experience. Walston v. County School Bd., 492 F.2d
919 (4th Cir. 1974); Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112
(5th Cir. 1972).
Professor Linn criticizes the LSAT because the criterion against which the test is
validated, first-year grades, is inadequate:
Inasmuch as grades are an inadequate criterion measure, then the absence of
predictive bias is of little value. The first-year grade average may be thought
to tap too narrow a range of behaviors; it may lack reliability, or it may itself
be subject to systematic errors for members of one group (i.e., it may be
biased). Greater emphasis needs to be placed on the selection and development of criterion measures that go beyond first-year grades.
Linn, Test Bias and the Prediction of Grades in Law School, 27 J.LEAL ED. 293,
323 (1975).
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Unlike a purely predictive validation study, in which all test takers
would be admitted to law school so that their performance could be
compared to their LSAT scores, this "concurrent" technique used for
the LSAT generalizes the correlation coefficient established between the
test scores and the law school grades of those who are admitted to law
school, and applies it for all future applicants who take the test whether
or not they are admitted.
Even assuming the acceptability of ETS' validation techniques,
there are data challenging the practical significance of the LSAT as a
predictor of law school performance. In 1962-63 the overall correlation of LSAT score to first-year average was at the .45 level. 2 1 8 One
critic challenged that level as being practically useless:
Research reports to date present overwhelming evidence that tests
used in the selection process do not predict the criterion of grades
at any practical level ....
LSAT or a combination of LSAT, WA [writing ability] and GB
[general background] do not predict law school grades (GPA) for
practical purposes of selection, placement or advisement for candidates seeking entrance into law school (correlations of approxi-

mately the .40 level) .279

The response of the ETS program director to this challenge by Dr.
Goolsby to the usefulness of the LSAT was quite interesting. While
admitting that the use of the LSAT was only thirteen percent better than
a random selection technique (for example by drawing applicants from
a barrel of the names of all applicants), Dr. Winterbottom said that any
improvement on chance was worth doing.
Because of the general increase in the number of students applying
to law school, an increase which has not been matched in classroom
space, the percentage of applicants accepted has tended to decline.
Thus, despite correlations which are admittedly low in absolute
terms, the relevance of the test scores as an admissions criterion
has probably been enhanced. 280
278. B.

PITCHER, THE LAw SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST AS A PREDICTOR OF

FIRST YEAR

LAw SCHOOL GRADES: 1962-63 (ETS Statistical Rep. No. 65-32, 1965). Generally a
correlation is statistically significant if it reaches a .05 level. Beyond that the determination of practical significance is a matter of judgment based on such things as the size of
the sample, whether the test will screen a few applicants in or will only screen out a
small percentage of the test takers.
279. Goolsby, A Study of the Criteria for Legal Education and Admission to the
Bar, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 175-77 (1967).
280. Winterbottom, Comments on "A Study of the Criteriafor Legal Education and

Admission to the Bar," an article by Dr. Thomas M. Goolsby, Jr., 21 J. LEGAL ED. 75

(1968).
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A more recent study shows a marked decline in correlation of LSAT
score to first-year law school performance. Based on surveys conducted
in 1972-73 for ninety-nine law schools, the median correlation for
predicting first-year law school grades from LSAT scores alone was
.33 281

Presumably, ETS would respond to the new figures by saying that
even greater admission pressures justify the continued reliance on LSAT
scores for law school admissions. But that conclusion is certainly more
questionable in light of the legal bases presently available to challenge
the validation techniques used for the LSAT. While the EEOC test
guidelines allow these so-called "rational" and "concurrent" validation
22
techniques where predictive techniques are not technically feasible,
recent employment discrimination authority makes their use legally
infeasible if not indefensible. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,28 the
company had used two kinds of tests, the Wonderlic and the Beta Exam.
The company used "concurrent" techniques to attempt to validate the
tests in preparation for litigation. The Supreme Court described the
technique used:
Jobs were grouped together solely by their proximity in the line of
progression; no attempt was made to analyze jobs in terms of the
particular skills they might require. All, or nearly all [incumbent]
employees in the selected groups participated in the study-105
employees in all, but only four Negroes. Within each job grouping,
the study compared the test scores of each employee with an independent "ranking" of the employee, relative to each of his coworkers, made by two of the employee's supervisors. The supervisors,
who did not know the test scores, were asked to
"determine which ones they felt irrespective of the job
that they were actually doing, but in their respective
jobs, did a better job than the person they were rating
against .... "284
281. ETS, LAw SCHOOL VALIDIrY STUDY SERVICE 20 (1973). It is claimed that the
LSAT may predict first-year law school performance better for blacks than whites, who
tend slightly to get better first-year grades than predicted by their test scores.
ETS, PREDICTING LAW SCHOOL GADEs FOR BLACK AMERICAN LAW STuDENTS (1973).
See Linn, supranote 277.

282. The test user must show that the best methods were not "technically feasible."
29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) (1975). Technical feasibility is defined in terms of a test sample
with a "sufficient number of minority individuals to achieve findings of statistical and
practical significance, the opportunity to obtain unbiased job performance criteria, etc."
Id. § 1607.4(b).
283. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
284. Id. at 430.
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The Court, looking to the EEOC guidelines, held this attempted validation "materially defective." First, the "study in this case involved no
analysis of the attributes of, or the particular skills needed in, the studied
job groups. 285 Secondly, the "study compared test scores with subjective supervisorial rankings '' 286 under standards that were vague and
fatally open to divergent interpretation with no neutral on-the-scene oversight. Thus there was no way to determine whether the criteria actually
considered were related to "job-specific ability." While the Court did
not mention it, the reliance on supervisor ratings allows the entry of
racial bias of the supervisors. 28 7 For example, in a study of how
supervisors in the Chicago police department rated patrolmen, it was
found that black officers who had been rated very highly by their white
supervisors scored very high on a deference to authority test, while no
such relationship was found for white policemen. 28 8 Thirdly, the study
focused only on the job groups near the top of various lines of progression, while the tests were used to select employees for entry level jobs.
Because performance on the job may teach people how to do well
on the tests and because many of the incumbent employees at high-level
jobs had never passed the tests, the Court found the validation study
inadequate because it applied to a situation different than the one for
which the test was used:
The fact that the best of those employees working near the top of
a line of progression score well on a test does not necessarily mean
that that test, or some particular cutoff score on the test, is a permissible measure of the289minimal qualifications of new workers, entering lower level jobs.
Finally, and most devastatingly for the use of concurrent validation
strategies, the Court found the sample of incumbent employees did not
reflect the pool of job applicants. "Albemarle's validation study dealt
only with job-experienced, white workers; but the tests themselves are
given to new job applicants, who are younger, largely inexperienced,.
and in many instances nonwhite."2 9 0 The Court relied on a general
standard of the American Psychological Association that the sample
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at 432.
Id.
See Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
See generally LEAA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF
The authors
PATROLMAN GRATIFICATIONS IN RELATION TO FIELD PERFORMANCE (1968).
of this study conclude that white police supervisors think all blacks inferior-a prejudice
that is carried over into their assessment of black policemen.

289. 422 U.S. at 434.
290. Id. at 435.
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population for the validation study must reflect the same characteristics
as the population for which the test will be used, 291 as well as the EEOC
29 2
guideline requirement of "differential validation" for minority groups.
Thus, the results of the validation study could not be generalized to the
entire applicant pool.
In sum, data is presently available for plaintiffs to make out a
prima facie case against the present law school admissions practices.
While present authority exists that might form the basis for upholding
the college degree requirement, the use of undergraduate averages, and
especially the LSAT, are quite vulnerable. No data are presently
published that would allow the law school world to carry its burden of
justification.
V.

REMEDIES:

A CHARTER FOR REFORM

Should minority plaintiffs be successful in challenging the present
law school admissions policies as racially discriminatory, they would be
entitled to relief under a broad mandate: "a court has not merely the
power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible
eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like
discrimination in the future." 93 Presumably the elements of the admission process found discriminatory, such as the college grade point average and LSAT score,2 94 would be enjoined, while affirmative relief could
be imposed including mandatory preferential admission programs.2 95
Such relief would be dramatic since it would completely cut admissions procedures free from their traditional moorings. Less dramatic relief is possible. For example the use of college grade point and LSAT
score might not be enjoined if it could be shown that theii racially disAMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, supra note 116, If C.5.4 (1966).
292. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b) (5) (1975). In United States v. Georgia Power Co.,
474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973), the company attempted concurrent validation with
incumbent employees. The court struck down the validation since the sample for the
study did not include the forty percent of job applicants, including most blacks, who had
failed the test and so were never hired. Id. at 916-18.
293. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
294. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
295. School desegregation remedial plans have included the use of racial ratios in
pupil assignment, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and
in faculty assignments, United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225
(1969). For other public employment race cases authorizing DeFunis-type preference
programs as remedies see Larson, Remedies for Racial Discriminationin State and Local
291.

Government Employment: A Survey and Analysis, 5 COLUM. HuMAN Ricarrs L. REv.

335 (1973). Such remedies have also been imposed in private employment cases, see
Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 254, at -.
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criminatory impact could be eliminated with the preferential admissions
program. But the prospect must be faced that traditional admissions
criteria are constitutionally vulnerable and, as Justice Douglas pointed
out in DeFunis,29 6 the present system of law school admissions is by no
means constitutionally mandated.
All that being clear, it is still not clear what ought to replace the
present system. Even with preference programs designed to protect
members of groups historically subject to discrimination, return to a
completely subjective admissions procedure, divorced from even the facial neutrality of the present admissions formulae, would hardly be
considered progress. Presumably, random selection from among all
applicants would be an improvement over completely subjective, political selection techniques.297 Such a system would offend the long standing notion that legal education can do better than chance in its admissions decisions.
If a new system of admissions is to be formed on the basis of
testing, the test or tests ought to be designed to withstand constitutional
challenge. What follows is a sketch of what could and should be done.
While conventional test theory might allow the development of a test
based on an analysis of performance in law school, critics of testing
would demand that the test be based on close analysis of desired "lifeoutcomes," in this case the practice of law.298 Presumably the answer
would be to study both to see any inconsistencies. While the practice of
law might involve more skills than can be taught in law school, any
inconsistencies ought to be decided in favor of the skills necessary to
practice law. Skills necessary to law school performance that are not
necessary to good lawyering ought not to be tested for and presumptively call for a change in legal education to conform with good lawyering in
the larger world.
While some data are available describing what lawyers do,219 and
296. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 331 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See
text accompanying note 23 supra.
297. A general system of random selection would tend to create greater homogeneity
across law school populations since the present self-selection based on published grade
point average and ISAT score cutoffs would no longer occur.
298. See McClelland, supra note 277, where the author claims that tests like the
LSAT fail because they are designed to test for shared middle class experiences that the
middle class test makers rely on in developing test items, instead of testing for skills and
traits known to be needed for the attainment of desired life-outcomes.
299. See J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ETHIcS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CTY BAR
(1966); J. CARLiN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962); E. SMIGEL, TE WALL STREET
LAwYmR (1964). For ongoing research see AMERICAN BAR FOUND., 1974 ANNUAL REPORT 8-9 (1974).
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literature is available setting forth the lawyering skills thought to be
amenable to law school instruction, 00 none of the data look to the
development of lawyering skills and traits to the end of establishing
appropriate criteria for admission to law school. It is a large item to get
any kind of agreement on the skills and traits incident to good lawyerbig, if, for no other reason, than the broad range of social roles that
lawyers perform in our society. But the development of data might
clarify and simplify the issues, or at least get the discussion framed in
common language of accepted usage. Perhaps the vulnerability of the
present law school admission practices might be a positive pressure for
agreement.
Presuming, perhaps rashly, that some agreement could be reached
on the skills and traits necessary to be a good lawyer and also presuming
that test items can be developed for some significant number of those
skills and traits, the next step is for each law school to run a predictive
validation study. And that is controversial because it entails giving the
test to the entire applicant pool to a law school and then admitting
people regardless of their test scores. While law schools could not
accept all tested applicants without vastly increasing a number of slots in
the entering class, they could select, for purposes of the validation study,
the entering class by random selection. The follow-up validation study
ought to focus first on law school performance but, in the longer run,
should be based on an assessment of performance of the subjects of the
study once they are practicing law.
If there is a substantial correlation between test performance and
subsequent performance in law school and in the practice of law, then
the test can be used to select among law school applicants those most
likely to be good lawyers. According to discrimination analysis, such a
hypothetical test could survive attack even if it were shown to have a
disparate impact on protected groups. However, the EEOC testing
guidelines require differential validation for minority and nonminority
groups.301 The test is limited to use for those groups for which it is
valid. If scores are valid at different levels for the groups, the cutoff
scores must be set to predict the same probability of success for each
group.
300. For the latest summary, see Holmes, Education for Competent Lawyering: Case
Method in a Functional Context, - COLUM. L. REV. - (1976). See also E. GEE & D.
JACKSON, FOLLOWING THE LEADER? THE UNEXAMINED CONSENSUS IN LAW SCHOOL
CURMCULA 1-10 (Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, Inc. publication, 1975).
301. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b) (5) (1975).
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Whether or not the validity of present law school admissions
practices is litigated, the data presently available to form the basis for a
challenge by groups historically discriminated against are clear enough
that the law school world ought to undertake some needed reforms in
this area.

